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THE CARBON-NEUTRAL INDIVIDUAL
MICHAEL P. VANDENBERGHt & ANNE C. STEINEMANN*
Reducing the risk of catastrophic climate change will require leveling off green-
house gas emissions over the short term and reducing emissions by an estimated
60-80% over the long term. To achieve these reductions, we argue that policy-
makers and regulators should focus not only on factories and other industrial
sources of emissions but also on individuals. We construct a model that demon-
strates that individuals contribute roughly one-third of carbon dioxide emissions in
the United States. This one-third share accounts for roughly 8% of the world's
total, more than the total emissions of any other country except China, and more
than several continents. We contend that it is desirable, if not imperative, that gov-
ernments address emissions from individual behavior. This task will be difficult
because individual behaviors, including idling cars and wasting electricity, are resis-
tant to change, even when the change is rational. Mindful of the costs, we propose
measures that have a high likelihood of success. We draw on norms theory and
empirical studies to demonstrate how legal reforms can tie the widely held abstract
norm of personal responsibility to the emerging concrete norm of carbon neutrality.
We suggest that these legal reforms could push carbon neutrality past a tipping
point, directly influencing many carbon-emitting individual behaviors and building
the public support necessary for policymakers to address the remaining sources.
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Climate change is one of the most contentious and important
challenges facing modern society. As Judge Richard Posner has
noted, we face a nontrivial risk of abrupt catastrophic climate change,
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and estimates that its costs will exceed 22% of the U.S. gross domestic
product "may be too low." 1
This Article proposes a new regulatory response. Rather than
focusing on reducing greenhouse gas emissions from factories and
other industrial sources, the Article focuses on reducing the contribu-
tions of individuals. The Article shows that reducing individuals'
greenhouse gas emissions in the United States can make a meaningful
contribution to the global effort to reduce the risk of catastrophic cli-
mate change. Furthermore, it argues that the law has a central role to
play in reducing emissions attributable to individuals by activating the
emerging norm of carbon neutrality. As the Article explains, an indi-
vidual can achieve carbon neutrality through a combination of emis-
sions reductions and offsets. Emissions reductions can be achieved
through a wide range of individual behavior changes, many of which
may yield large reductions at surprisingly low costs. Offsets can be
generated by inducing other sources to reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions,2 such as through investments in renewable energy sources or
through the capture of methane from landfills. 3
Although their specific estimates vary, many climate scientists
and policymakers agree that avoiding catastrophic climate change
requires leveling off carbon dioxide emissions over the next decade
and reducing emissions by 60-80% by around 2050.4 Changes in indi-
vidual behaviors can play an important role in achieving these short-
and long-term targets, although this Article focuses principally on the
short-term targets. Short-term reductions function like an option,
providing the time to make massive additional reductions if the data
in the interim confirm that long-term reductions will be necessary. 5 If
we fail to purchase the option, we may lose the ability to reduce the
1 See RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 5, 49 (2004) (citing
WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS & JOSEPH BOYER, WARMING THE WORLD: ECONOMIC MODELS
OF GLOBAL WARMING 90 (2000)).
2 See, e.g., CARBON TRUST, CARBON FOOTPRINTS IN THE SUPPLY CHAIN: THE NEXT
STEP FOR BUSINESS 5 (2006), available at http://www.carbontrust.co.uk/Publications/
publicationdetail.htm?productid=CTC616 (noting that carbon offset can be created when
one party "buys credits associated with environmental projects that reduce emissions of
carbon dioxide or other greenhouse gases around the world, as a way of offsetting [the
party's] own carbon emissions"); EcoBusinessLinks, Carbon Emissions Offset, http://www.
ecobusinesslinks.com/carbonoffsetwind-creditscarbon-reduction.htm (last visited Oct.
5, 2007) ("Carbon offsets enable individuals and businesses to reduce the C02 emissions
they are responsible for by offsetting, reducing or displacing the C02 in another place,
typically where it is more economical to do so.").
3 See TerraPass Additionality Project, Tontitown LFG Project Review Document v1.1
(2007), http://terrapass.pbwiki.com/Project%20Review%20Document (evaluating effec-
tiveness of carbon dioxide offset program involving methane capture from landfill).
4 See infra text accompanying notes 47-55.
5 POSNER, supra note 1, at 161-63.
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risk of catastrophic climate change once climate predictions are more
certain. At that point, the uncertainty about the effects of climate
change will be gone, but so will the opportunity to avoid them.
We cannot know whether the predictions about catastrophic cli-
mate change and the emissions reductions necessary to reduce the
risk-or to preserve the ability to decide later to reduce the risk-are
accurate. Yet we recognize that scientists and policymakers cannot
afford to be wrong. Even if there is only a small chance that the pre-
dictions are accurate, the harms of catastrophic climate change are so
great, the required emissions reductions must be so prompt, and the
potential costs of emissions reductions are so great, that no major
source of greenhouse gases can be ignored.
This Article first demonstrates that individual behavior is a tre-
mendous and overlooked source of greenhouse gases, accounting for
one-third of all U.S. carbon dioxide emissions. The Article then
explores the prospect of reducing emissions from individual behavior
at low cost through measures that foster the emerging norm of carbon
neutrality.
Despite the importance of individuals and households to the
study of economics, environmental regulation, and other fields,
6
scholars are only beginning to focus on these entities as a discrete field
of study in legal scholarship. Perhaps as a result, to the extent that
federal policymakers have focused on climate change at all, they have
directed far more attention toward large industrial sources. States
have been more active in addressing climate change, but they too have
6 See, e.g., Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1297-99 (2001)
(arguing that in some large-number, small-payoff collective action problems, individual
behaviors are more effectively altered by improving convenience than by influencing social
norms); Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around
the Hearth, 116 YALE L.J. 226, 327-28 (2006) (emphasizing importance of studying indi-
vidual household dynamics in numerous academic fields); Andrew Green, You Can't Pay
Them Enough: Subsidies, Environmental Law, and Social Norms, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 407, 428-49 (2006) (arguing that government subsidies for "green" behaviors do not
necessarily enhance development of environmental social norms); Anne C. Steinemann,
Rethinking Human Health Impact Assessment, 20 ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 627,
638 (2000) (highlighting need to include individual health effects in environmental impact
assessments); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Order Without Social Norms: How Personal Norm
Activation Can Protect the Environment, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1101 (2005) (examining influ-
ence of personal and social norms on environmentally significant individual behavior); see
also NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DECISION MAKING FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: SOCIAL
AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE RESEARCH PRIORITIES 69-84 (Garry D. Brewer & Paul C.
Stern eds., 2005) [hereinafter NRC, DECISION MAKING] (examining importance of stud-
ying environmentally significant individual behavior).
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focused principally on large industrial sources.7 Some states have
addressed emissions from individuals indirectly by regulating emis-
sions from manufacturers of consumer products.8 The federal govern-
ment, for its part, has not only failed to address individual behavior
directly, but it also has sought to block state efforts by asserting that
states do not have the authority either to impose greenhouse gas
tailpipe standards on auto manufacturers9 or to force the federal gov-
ernment to do so.10
Part I of this Article examines the threat posed by global
warming and identifies the short- and long-term emissions reductions
necessary to reduce the risk of catastrophic climate change. Part II
presents a model of carbon dioxide emissions from individual
behavior, which we define conservatively to include only those behav-
iors that are substantially and directly controlled by individuals, such
as personal driving and household energy use. Even under this con-
servative approach, the model's results are remarkable: The average
American individual's share of total emissions in 2000 was more than
14,000 pounds of carbon dioxide, for a total of 4.1 trillion pounds for
all Americans. By comparison, all of American industry emitted 3.9
trillion pounds in 2000. The 4.1 trillion pounds attributable to
American individuals comprise roughly 32% of total U.S. annual
emissions" and 8% of the world total. It is larger than the emissions
from all of Africa, Central America, and South America combined,
and larger than the emissions of every foreign country besides China.
Thus, small shifts in individual behavior in the United States can gen-
erate emissions reductions that exceed the total emissions of entire
industry sectors, countries, and continents.
7 John C. Dernbach, Harnessing Individual Behavior to Address Climate Change:
Options for Congress, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 3, 7), avail-
able at http://ssrn.com/abstract=983632.
8 See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 2175 (2007) (regulating automobile tailpipe
emissions); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62-242.400 (2007) (same).
9 See, e.g., Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Witherspoon, No. 04-6663, 2007 WL
135688, at *2, *11 & n.2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2007) (describing EPA effort to overturn state
law regulating tailpipe emissions); Average Fuel Economy Standards for Light Trucks
Model Years 2008-2011, 71 Fed. Reg. 17,566, 17,656 (Apr. 6, 2006) (executive summary of
rule codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 523, 533, 537) ("[W]e [the National Highway Transportation
Safety Administration] have re-analyzed all issues carefully as set forth below, and deter-
mined, based on existing and foreseeable technologies for reducing CO 2 emissions from
motor vehicles, that the effect under EPCA and the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution is that State regulation of those emissions is preempted.").
10 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1450-51 (2007) (describing EPA's argu-
ment that Clean Air Act does not require it to regulate tailpipe emissions).
11 The remaining two-thirds of emissions come from industry, commercial sources, and
nonindividual transportation. See infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
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Part III of this Article identifies the most important carbon-emit-
ting individual behaviors. Some of these behaviors can be easily mod-
ified to generate large emissions reductions in the short term. We call
these behaviors the "low-hanging fruit." Many legal, economic, and
social regulatory measures can influence carbon-emitting individual
behaviors. Part IV focuses on one such measure: norm activation.
This Part demonstrates how legal reforms can activate norms that (1)
directly influence the "low-hanging fruit" behaviors and (2) build the
public support necessary to adopt measures that address behaviors
that are more difficult to modify. Drawing on insights from law and
social psychology, this Part argues that the carbon-neutrality norm can
be linked to the norm of personal responsibility, which entails the
commitment not to take actions that harm others. Scholars discount
this norm's application to climate change,12 but we show how it can
work to change carbon-emitting behaviors.
The norm of carbon neutrality suggests that an individual's obli-
gation not to harm others can be fulfilled by achieving a carbon foot-
print of zero, which can be accomplished by reducing carbon
emissions and purchasing offsets for the remaining emissions. Carbon
neutrality is already becoming widespread; it was the "word of the
year" for 2006,13 and it has been adopted by numerous individuals,
governments, corporations, sports leagues, and nongovernmental
organizations. 14 Although the term has already begun to spread, par-
ticularly among those who hold strong environmental norms, policy-
makers can enhance the influence of carbon neutrality by
disseminating information that ties carbon neutrality to personal
responsibility.
Information disclosure targeted at such norm activation also may
complement more traditional regulatory measures, such as taxes, sub-
sidies, efficiency standards, cap-and-trade schemes, and investments in
technology and infrastructure. Many of these traditional measures are
grounded in the belief that individuals are rational actors with ade-
quate information. Empirical studies of carbon-emitting behaviors
demonstrate, however, that individuals often lack information, are
influenced by cognitive biases in decisionmaking processes, face infra-
12 See, e.g., Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, It's Not My Fault: Global Warming and Indi-
vidual Moral Obligations, in 5 ADVANCES IN THE ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
RESOURCES 285, 289-94 (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Richard B. Howarth eds., 2005)
(arguing that individuals have no moral obligation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions).
13 The editors of the New Oxford American Dictionary named "carbon neutral" their
Word of the Year for 2006. Oxford University Press Blog, Carbon Neutral: Oxford Word
of the Year (Nov. 13, 2006), http://blog.oup.com/2006/11/carbon-neutral_.
14 See infra text accompanying notes 201-15.
Reprinted With The Permission of New York University School of Law
1678 [Vol. 82:1673
HeinOnline  -- 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1678 2007
THE CARBON-NEUTRAL INDIVIDUAL
structure or resource barriers, and, in some circumstances, act in
socially, rather than individually, interested ways. Information disclo-
sure may enable the traditional measures to account for many of these
decisional lacunae and may build public support for the adoption of
the measures in the first place.
Part V contains our policy recommendations. It argues that legal
measures and information disclosure can push the emerging carbon-
neutrality norm toward a tipping point without triggering understand-
able concerns about government involvement in propaganda. This
Part suggests that disclosure of accurate information on the adverse
consequences of carbon-emitting behaviors-and on the steps that can
be taken to ameliorate those consequences-can activate climate-rele-
vant norms. For example, Part V proposes an Individual Carbon
Release Inventory that would collect, assess, and provide the public
with information about the aggregate and mean carbon dioxide emis-
sions from individual behaviors. Similarly, efforts to identify and dis-
close the economic and health effects of climate change might be
necessary to reduce carbon-emitting behaviors by linking carbon neu-
trality to personal responsibility. Government also may be able to
promote carbon neutrality by facilitating development of standards
for personal carbon calculators and emissions offsets.
The Article concludes by recommending an intensive research
effort by environmental engineers, social scientists, and law and policy
scholars to identify the behaviors that contribute to carbon emissions,
the social and economic influences on those behaviors, and the
optimal legal and policy responses. Treating individual behavior as a
discrete source of carbon emissions will require regulatory scholars
and policymakers to leave their comfort zone, but reducing the risk of
catastrophic climate change may require no less.
I
THE IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
The science of climate change is daunting. Yet evaluating the
appropriate regulatory response requires understanding what contrib-
utes to climate change, the likelihood and magnitude of the harms it
will cause, and the emissions reductions necessary to reduce the risk
of those harms. This Part provides a brief overview of these issues.
A. Climate Change Science
Growing numbers of scientists have become concerned about the
possibility of catastrophic climate change. In 2007, the
Reprinted With The Permission of New York University School of Law
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Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)1 5 concluded
that there is a greater than 90% probability that climate changes
observed in the last fifty years cannot be explained without accounting
for human emissions of greenhouse gases. 16 Although changes in the
earth's orbit have influenced climate changes in the past, including the
ice ages of the last several hundred thousand years, the IPCC con-
cluded that anthropogenic gases are driving the recent changes. 17 Sev-
eral anthropogenic greenhouse gases contribute to these changes, but
carbon dioxide accounts for roughly 85% of the climate-forcing effect
of these gases 18 and is the principal focus of this Article.
The IPCC report's conclusions are consistent with statements by
other respected scientific bodies. For example, in 2005 the national
academies of science of the United States and the other Group of
Eight (G8) nations issued an unprecedented joint statement blaming
greenhouse gases for the earth's recent warming trend. 19 Similarly, a
1997 statement issued by a majority of the living winners of the Nobel
Prizes in the sciences identified global warming as "one of the most
serious threats to the planet and to future generations.
'20
Although much has been made of the state of the scientific
debate regarding climate change, 21 a recent assessment of relevant sci-
entific papers published in peer-reviewed journals between 1993 and
2003 concluded that none disagreed with the statement that the
15 The IPCC is composed of hundreds of scientists organized by the United Nations
Environment Programme and the World Meteorological Organization, and its most recent
report was approved by the governments of the United States and 112 other countries.
Elisabeth Rosenthal & Andrew C. Revkin, Science Panel Says Global Warming is "Une-
quivocal," N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2007, at Al.
16 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 10 (2007).
17 Id. at 10-12.
18 Carbon dioxide accounted for 84.6% of the carbon dioxide equivalent gases emitted
in 2004. John C. Dernbach, Stabilizing and Then Reducing U.S. Energy Consumption:
Legal and Policy Tools for Efficiency and Conservation, 37 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,003,
10,010-11 n.76 (2007); see also James Hansen & Makiko Sato, Greenhouse Gas Growth
Rates, 101 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 16,109, 16,111 (2004) (concluding that climate-forcing
effects of greenhouse gases in 2003 were result of carbon dioxide (90%), nitrous oxide
(5%), methane (4%), and Montreal Protocol trace gases (e.g., chlorofluorocarbons) and
other trace gases (1%)).
19 Joint Science Academies' Statement: Global Response to Climate Change (June 7,
2005), available at http://nationalacademies.org/onpi/06072005.pdf.
20 Petition from the Union of Concerned Scientists, World Scientists' Call for Action
(1997), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/global-warming/science/world-scientists-call-for-
action-at-the-kyoto-climate-summit.html.
21 See Julia B. Corbett & Jessica L. Durfee, Testing Public (Un)certainty of Science:
Media Representations of Global Warming, 26 Sci. COMM. 129, 130-37 (2004) (discussing
ways in which media communicates or constructs scientific uncertainty regarding global
warming).
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"[e]arth's climate is being affected by human activities. '2 2 Further-
more, even the Bush Administration, which has declined to adopt
mandatory controls on greenhouse gas emissions and has opposed
state regulation of such emissions,2 3 has accepted the conclusions of
the IPCC report.24 In addition, the U.S. Climate Change Science
Program concluded in 2006 not only that the earth is warming but that
human emissions of greenhouse gases are driving the warming. 2
5
Modeling is an important part of the scientific understanding of
climate change, but perhaps the most compelling example of the cli-
mate change data arises from the long-term relationship between
carbon dioxide and temperature. Looking backward does not require
scientists to account for the prospective activities of complex systems,
as modeling does. Rather, it requires them to identify how those com-
plex systems have responded to comparable stresses in the past.
26
Figure 1 demonstrates the historical relationship between carbon
dioxide and temperature over the past 420,000 years.27
22 Naomi Oreskes, The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change, 306 SCIENCE 1686,
1686 (2004).
23 See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
24 Rosenthal & Revkin, supra note 15.
25 U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROGRAM, TEMPERATURE TRENDS IN THE LOWER
ATMOSPHERE: STEPS FOR UNDERSTANDING AND RECONCILING DIFFERENCES 2 (2006),
available at http://www.climatescience.gov/Library/sap/sapl-1/finalreport/sapl-1-final-all
.pdf ("Studies to detect climate change and attribute its causes using patterns of observed
temperature change in space and time show clear evidence of human influences on the
climate system. ... ); see also Press Release, Nat'l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin.,
Report Reconciles Atmospheric Temperature Trends (May 2, 2006), available at http://
www.climatescience.gov/Library/pressreleases/pressrelease2may2006.htm ("[T]he
observed patterns of [climate] change over the past 50 years cannot be explained by nat-
ural processes alone .... ), quoted in Juliet Eilperin, Study Reconciles Data in Measuring
Climate Change, WASH. POST, May 3, 2006, at A3.
26 Both carbon dioxide and temperature can be measured from air bubbles captured in
glaciers, and through this method scientists have collected data reaching back at least
420,000 years. See, e.g., Nicolas Caillon et al., Timing of Atmospheric C0 2 and Antarctic
Temperature Changes Across Termination II1, 299 SCIENCE 1728 (2003) (discussing analysis
of temperature and carbon dioxide concentrations in Vostok ice core in Antarctica); J.R.
Petit et al., Climate and Atmospheric History of the Past 420,000 Years from the Vostok Ice
Core, Antarctica, 399 NATURE 429 (1999) (same).
27 The chart was prepared by Jonathan Gilligan, Senior Lecturer in the Earth and Envi-
ronmental Sciences Department at Vanderbilt University. The chart is based on data avail-
able from Jean Robert Petit et al., NOAA/NGDC Paleoclimatology Program, Vostok Ice
Core Data for 420,000 Years, IGBP PAGES/World Data Center for Paleoclimatology Data
Contribution Series #2001-076 (2001), ftp://ftp.ncdc.noaa.gov/pub/data/paleo/icecore/
antarctica/vostok/deutnat.txt, ftp://ftp.ncdc.noaa.gov/pub/data/paleo/icecore/antarctica/
vostok/co2nat.txt, which was used for Petit et al., supra note 26, and is used here by
permission.
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As Figure 1 suggests, the relationship between carbon dioxide
levels and temperature is complex. In some time periods, carbon
dioxide increases precede temperature increases, but in others, tem-
perature increases precede carbon dioxide increases. 28 Nevertheless,
during this 420,000 year period, the data demonstrate a remarkable
relationship between temperature and carbon dioxide. As shown in
Figure 1, today's carbon dioxide levels, at roughly 380 parts per mil-
lion (ppm), are higher than they have been at any time during this
period. If atmospheric concentrations continue to increase at the cur-
rent rate, total emissions will reach 560 ppm, roughly double
pre-Industrial Revolution levels, by the end of this century.29
The historical relationship between carbon dioxide levels and
temperature is striking. This relationship suggests two plausible
28 Changes in Earth's orbit and other influences are thought to affect both temperature
and carbon dioxide levels. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra
note 16, at 9.
29 Atmospheric carbon dioxide levels were roughly 380 ppm in 2006 and have been
increasing at a rate of about 2.0 ppm per year since 2000. James E. Hansen, A Slippery
Slope: How Much Global Warming Constitutes "Dangerous Anthropogenic Interference?,"
68 CLIMATIC CHANGE 269, 277 (2005). Increases of 2.0 ppm per year would generate levels
of 560 ppm by roughly 2096. Carbon dioxide concentrations were roughly 280 ppm in
1750. See H. Friedli et al., Ice Core Record of the '3C/ 2C Ratio of Atmospheric C0 2 in the
Past Two Centuries, 324 NATURE 237, 237 fig. 1 (1986); A. Neftel et al., Evidence from
Polar Ice Cores for the Increase in Atmospheric C0 2 in the Past Two Centuries, 315 NATURE
45, 45 fig.1 (1985).
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scenarios for the future: Either the relationship between carbon
dioxide and temperature that has existed for at least 420,000 years will
no longer continue, or temperature will once again catch up with
carbon dioxide levels, meaning substantial temperature increases are
on the horizon. Given the conclusions of the IPCC and many promi-
nent scientists, we believe that it is prudent to understand and respond
to the potential harms that may arise from a substantial temperature
increase.
B. Potential Harms of Climate Change
One potential harm of climate change is a sea level increase that
could fundamentally reshape human and other life on the planet. For
example, the 2007 IPCC report predicts that if carbon dioxide levels
reach 560 ppm, global average temperature increases of 3.5-8°F are
likely, with a "best estimate" increase of just over 5'F.30 The report
notes that polar regions will warm more quickly than nonpolar
regions, 31 and that polar average temperatures at the lower end of its
predicted range for global average temperatures last occurred 125,000
years ago, when sea levels were thirteen to twenty feet higher than
today.
32
The IPCC report only projects sea level increases of up to two
feet by 2100, but it notes that its short-term estimate excludes ice
sheet flows from Greenland, and it does not estimate longer-term sea-
level rises.33 Several leading scientists have argued that, based on
recent studies of the Greenland ice cap, the risk of a sea-level rise of
thirteen feet or more this century is now "within the realm of possi-
bility."'34 Furthermore, James Hansen, a leading climate scientist, has
30 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 16, at 12 (based
on estimate of 2-4.5'C range and "best estimate" of 3°C). We have converted all tempera-
ture change estimates in this Article from degrees Celsius to degrees Fahrenheit by multi-
plying degrees Celsius by 1.8.
31 See id. at 7, 15 (noting that Arctic warming rate has been higher than global average
over past century and predicting future warming to be similar to recent patterns).
32 See id. at 9 (noting that polar average temperatures were 5.4-9°F higher about
125,000 years ago, when sea levels were likely thirteen to twenty feet higher). Although
the 5.4-9°F range for polar average temperature increases is higher than the IPCC's pre-
diction for global average increases of 3.5-81F, the IPCC's best estimate for global average
temperature increases (5°F) may yield polar average increases of 10'F. See James Hansen,
The Threat to the Planet, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, July 13, 2006, at 12, 13 ("The business-as-usual
scenario, with five degrees Fahrenheit global warming and ten degrees Fahrenheit at the
ice sheets, certainly would cause the disintegration of the ice sheets.").
33 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 16, at 13-14 &
tbl.SPM.3.
34 See Hansen, supra note 29, at 274 (asserting that recent studies suggest risk of rapid
disintegration of Greenland ice cap); Roger Harrabin, Top Scientist's Fears for Climate,
BBC NEWS, Aug. 31, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/530357 4 .stm (quoting
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noted that three million years ago, when global average temperatures
were 5F warmer than today's temperatures (and equal to the IPCC's
best estimate if carbon dioxide concentrations double), sea levels were
roughly eighty feet higher.35 Sea-level increases of eighty feet would
inundate many of the major cities on the east coast of the United
States, and most of Florida, with similar effects around the world.
36
Although these increases would not occur immediately, once the pro-
cess begins it may be inexorable, with levels rising as much as three
feet or more every few decades for centuries. 37 Other possible effects
of climate change include increased storm intensity, more frequent
and intense floods and droughts, redistribution of current rainfall pat-
terns, bleaching of coral reefs, ocean acidification, and species loss. 38
A long-term objective to prevent these harms can be defined as
the avoidance of "dangerous anthropogenic interference with the cli-
mate system," as stated in the U.N. Framework Convention on
Climate Change.39 Although critics have derided the ambiguity of this
objective, scientists have identified a number of outcomes that meet
the definition of dangerous, such as "warming involving risk to unique
and threatened systems and warming engendering a risk of large-scale
discontinuities in the climate system."' 40 An example of the first type
of outcome is the destruction of coral reef systems on a large scale,
Professor John Holdren as stating that complete melting of Greenland ice cap "could
increase world-wide sea levels by 7m (23ft), swamping many cities").
35 Hansen, supra note 32, at 13; see also James E. Hansen, Can We Still Avoid Dan-
gerous Human-Made Climate Change?, 73 Soc. RES. 949, 966-67 (2006) [hereinafter
Hansen, Can We Avoid?] (arguing that rate of CO 2 emissions must level off soon and
decline substantially before midcentury, while non-CO 2 forcings must decrease to achieve
no more than 1°C temperature increase); James Hansen, Defusing the Global Warming
Time Bomb, Sci. AM., Mar. 2004, at 68, 74-75 (positing that "highest prudent level of
additional global warming is not more than about one degree C" to avoid large-scale ice-
sheet breakup).
36 Hansen, supra note 32, at 13 (estimating that sea-level rise of eighty feet would inun-
date Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and most of Florida, and would displace 250 million
people in China, 120 million people in Bangladesh, and 150 million people in India).
37 See id. (noting that in past, "once ice sheets began to collapse, [sea levels] rose one
meter [about three feet] every twenty years for centuries"); see also INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 16, at 13 tbl.SPM.3 (projecting future sea-level
rises).
38 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 16, at 7 ("At
continental, regional and ocean basin scales, numerous long-term changes in climate have
been observed. These include changes in arctic temperatures and ice, widespread changes
in precipitation amounts, ocean salinity, wind patterns and aspects of extreme weather
including droughts, heavy precipitation, heat waves and the intensity of tropical
cyclones."); Brian C. O'Neill & Michael Oppenheimer, Dangerous Climate Impacts and the
Kyoto Protocol, 296 SCIENCE 1971, 1971 (2002) (discussing coral bleaching).
39 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, May 9, 1992, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107.
40 O'Neill & Oppenheimer, supra note 38, at 1971.
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which appears to be occurring in a number of regions and is likely to
become severe if global warming exceeds roughly 2°F,41 a tempera-
ture increase below the IPCC's projected range if carbon dioxide con-
centrations double.42 Examples of the second type of outcome
include several events that have a low probability of occurring, at least
in the short term, but which would cause substantial harm: the disin-
tegration of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet (which could cause a sea-
level rise of roughly thirteen to twenty feet worldwide) or a disruption
of the thermohaline circulation in the oceans (which could cause wide
swings in temperature in Europe and elsewhere).4 3 These changes
may be catastrophic not only because of their severity but also
because they may occur abruptly, providing little time for adapta-
tion.a n Perhaps as troubling as the first-order environmental impacts
of climate change are the ways in which people might react to these
impacts, whether through migration, social conflict, or other means.
A recent study prepared for the Department of Defense raises con-
cerns about the possibility of armed conflict.
45
Media reports frame this science by asking whether doubts exist
about climate change.4 6 But given the possible magnitude of the
harms, the issue is not whether any doubts exist, but whether there is
sufficient likelihood to justify some responses, and if so, at what cost.
Our view is that even assuming there is only a small chance that some
of the more catastrophic outcomes will occur (for example, that sea
levels will rise thirteen to twenty feet in the next hundred years and
that we will lose Florida over the longer term), the outcomes are suffi-
ciently awful that a concerted response is prudent.
41 Id.
42 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
43 O'Neill & Oppenheimer, supra note 38, at 1971-72.
44 See POSNER, supra note 1, at 253-54 (arguing that "a wait-and-see policy would be
perilous" because of possibility that "atmospheric concentrations [of carbon dioxide] may
reach a level that triggers abrupt, catastrophic global warming"). Although we agree with
Judge Posner that abruptness is important because it reduces our ability to adapt, we con-
clude that abruptness is not a necessary predicate for action regarding some of the low-
probability and serious-consequence harms of climate change. For example, sea-level rises
in the tens of feet, even if gradual, will not allow for human adaptation on any meaningful
level.
45 See PETER SCHWARTZ & DOUG RANDALL, DEP'T OF DEF., AN ABRUPT CLIMATE
CHANGE SCENARIO AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY
14-19 (2003), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/schwartz.pdf (discussing
potential national-security implications of climate change).
46 See Corbett & Durfee, supra note 21, at 132-36 (discussing ways in which media
presents scientific uncertainty that tend to underplay degree of scientific consensus).
Reprinted With The Permission of New York University School of Law
December 2007]
HeinOnline  -- 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1685 2007
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
C. Emissions Reduction Targets
If we assume that there is a nontrivial risk of catastrophic climate
change, we must next determine what level of emissions reductions
will reduce the risk of the most serious harms. 47 Determination of this
level requires assumptions about the target level for global average
temperature, the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere
that will generate the target level, and the emissions of carbon dioxide
that will generate the requisite concentration in the atmosphere.
These are difficult judgments. For the purposes of this Article, we
draw on the conclusions of several leading climate scientists. For
example, James Hansen and a growing number of other experts have
argued that to avoid the dangerous impacts of climate change, temper-
ature increases over year 2000 temperatures should be limited to
roughly 2°F.48 To reduce the risk that temperature increases will
exceed this threshold, total concentrations of carbon dioxide-cur-
rently at 380 ppm-should be kept below roughly 500 ppm. 49 Even
this will only improve the chances of avoiding catastrophic events like
widespread flooding, but it will not ensure that substantial climate
change effects will not occur.
50
To keep atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide below
roughly 500 ppm, many scientists have argued that we should level off
emissions growth in the near term to enable time for technological
developments to generate large reductions over the longer term. In
the absence of near-term reductions, the long-term reductions neces-
sary to avoid the most dangerous climate impacts are unrealistically
large.51 For example, Hansen has argued that measures should be
47 O'Neill & Oppenheimer, supra note 38, at 1972 (discussing possible dangerous
impacts of climate change and emissions reductions needed to avoid them).
48 Hansen, Can We Avoid?, supra note 35, at 965-66 (expressing target temperature
change as 1'C, roughly equivalent to 2*F); cf INT'L CLIMATE CHANGE TASKFORCE,
MEETING THE CLIMATE CHALLENGE: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CLIMATE CHANGE TASKFORCE 3 (2005), available at http://www.whrc.org/resources/
published literature/pdf/ByersetallnstPubPolRes.1.05.pdf (concluding that increases of
2°C (3.6°F) above recent temperature levels will increase "the risks of abrupt, accelerated,
or runaway climate change").
49 See INT'L CLIMATE CHANGE TASKFORCE, supra note 48, at 4 (suggesting 400 ppm
target carbon dioxide level); Hansen & Sato, supra note 18, at 16,114 (concluding that
stabilization will require carbon dioxide levels not to exceed 440 to 520 ppm); O'Neill &
Oppenheimer, supra note 38, at 1972 (concluding that stabilization will require carbon
dioxide levels not to exceed 450 ppm target).
50 See O'Neill & Oppenheimer, supra note 38, at 1972 (pointing out that it is not cer-
tain that stabilization at 450 ppm would forestall disintegration of West Antarctic Ice
Sheet).
51 Id. (suggesting that delaying achievement of Kyoto Protocol cumulative emissions
target from 2010 to 2020 may require up to "staggering" 8% reduction per year to begin
before 2040 and concluding that "such high rates of reduction may be prohibitively
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adopted to achieve a short-term goal of leveling off carbon dioxide
emissions by roughly 2015 and a long-term goal of a rapid decrease
from current levels by roughly 2050.52 Climate scientists differ on the
precise reductions necessary, but the estimated reductions by 2050
tend to cluster in the 60-80% range.5 3 Although policymakers have
proposed various emissions-reduction targets, many of their proposals
also reflect the need to achieve a near-term leveling off in carbon
dioxide emissions and a substantial decrease by roughly 2050.
54
Achieving these reductions will be particularly difficult because, in the
absence of extraordinary measures, emissions are expected to increase
substantially during this period. In fact, researchers such as Stephen
Pacala and Robert Socolow predict that if we continue "business as
usual," emissions will double by the middle of this century. 5
5
II
THE CONTRIBUTION OF INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR
A recent New York Times editorial on climate change referred to
the sources of carbon emissions as "industrial emissions, '56 as if indus-
trial emissions are synonymous with all emissions. This Part demon-
strates that individual behavior is a discrete, overlooked source of
enormous quantities of carbon dioxide emissions. It then presents a
model that estimates the releases of carbon dioxide attributable to the
average individual in the United States and to all individuals in the
costly"); see also Stephen Pacala & Robert Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Cli-
mate Problem for the Next 50 Years with Current Technologies, 305 SCIENCE 968, 968-69
(2004) (concluding that near- and mid-term reductions are necessary as stop-gap measure
to provide time for "revolutionary technologies" to be developed to achieve more dramatic
reductions).
52 Hansen, Can We Avoid?, supra note 35, at 966.
53 See, e.g., ROYAL COMM'N ON ENVTL. POLLUTION, ENERGY-THE CHANGING CLI-
MATE 182 (2000), available at http://www.rcep.org.uk/pdf/chplO.pdf (recommending 60%
reductions in emissions by 2050); UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, How To AVOID
DANGEROUS CLIMATE CHANGE: A TARGET FOR U.S. EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS 1 (2007),
available at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/global-warming/emissions-target
-report.pdf (recommending that industrialized nations reduce emissions 70-80% from year
2000 levels by 2050); see also T.M.L. Wigley, The Climate Change Commitment, 307
SCIENCE 1766, 1768-69 (2005) (concluding that reducing emissions substantially below pre-
sent levels will be necessary to stabilize global mean temperatures).
54 See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CLIMATE CHANGE: GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION
BILLS IN THE 110TH CONGRESS 2-3 (2007), available at http://www.ncseonline.org/nle/
crsreports/07May/RL33846.pdf (discussing bills introduced in 110th Congress that would
impose controls on emissions through declining emissions caps).
55 Pacala & Socolow, supra note 51, at 968. Pacala and Socolow focus only on carbon
dioxide.
56 Editorial, Global Warming and the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2006, at A12.
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aggregate. The Part concludes by evaluating the significance of these
emissions.
A. Individual Behavior as a Source Category
The framing of pollution sources exerts a powerful influence on
the regulatory and social forces brought to bear on them.57 Identi-
fying a source begins the process of attributing a quantity of emissions
to that source, assigning blame for the harms caused by those emis-
sions, and directing regulatory resources toward emissions reductions.
Sources that are perceived as the largest emitters naturally attract the
most public and regulatory attention.
Since the explosion of environmental regulation in the early
1970s, policymakers have focused most regulatory prescriptions on
large industrial sources. 58 In contrast, they have focused little regula-
tory attention on individuals and households.59 Framing pollution as
an industrial problem generates remedies that involve industrial regu-
lation. Thus, controlling emissions from automobiles becomes a
matter of adopting technology-based standards on motor vehicle
emissions, with little emphasis on the number and use of the vehi-
cles. 60 Controlling emissions from residential electricity use becomes
a matter of adopting technology-based or market-allowance-based
controls on electrical utilities, with far less emphasis on the amount of
energy consumed in the home.
61
Assessments of the sources of carbon dioxide emissions have fol-
lowed this traditional pattern. The presentation of 2004 carbon
dioxide emissions data by the Energy Information Administration
(EIA) of the Department of Energy demonstrates the point.
Although the EIA identified industrial, commercial, transportation,
and residential categories of emitters, it failed to identify individual
behavior as a discrete source. 62 Rather, it distributed the emissions
57 See Steinemann, supra note 6, at 635 (noting that public concern about health
hazards can prompt government agencies to conduct human-health impact assessments);
Michael P. Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV: The Individual as Regulated Entity in
the New Era of Environmental Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 515, 610 (2004) (arguing that pro-
viding consumers with information about products' environmental impact pressures manu-
facturers to create more ecofriendly products).
58 Vandenbergh, supra note 57, at 517-18.
59 Id. at 524-35.
60 See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000) (requiring EPA to
impose pollution control requirements on motor vehicles).
61 See generally Vandenbergh, supra note 57, at 524-29 (discussing traditional regula-
tory focus on command-and-control regulations and economic incentives aimed at indus-
trial sources).
62 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, 2004 ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 340
fig.12.2, available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/FTPROOT/multifuel/038404.pdf [hereinafter
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attributable to individual behavior among at least two sectors: (1) res-
idential (e.g., household electricity and direct energy use), and
(2) transportation (personal driving, flying, and mass transportation).
By dividing the emissions from individual behavior into two catego-
ries, one of which (transportation) includes emissions from many
types of sources other than individuals, this framing obscures the size
of the total emissions from individuals as a discrete source category.
Other organizations that report emissions data also follow this
approach. For example, a 2006 UN report divided greenhouse gas
sources into several categories, none of which includes individual
behavior as a discrete category.
63
A viable alternative is to begin by framing the sources of carbon
emissions based on the types of policies or regulatory measures that
might be effective in controlling them, and to work backward to deter-
mine the emissions that may be generated by these types of sources.
64
If regulators begin by assuming that changing individual behavior is a
viable means of achieving desired environmental outcomes, the anal-
ysis shifts. Then the question becomes, What behaviors are under the
individual's control? With this framing in mind, the magnitude of the
total contribution from individual behavior will come into focus as
emissions from household activities and personal transportation are
aggregated. The model presented below estimates the contribution of
individual behavior using this approach.
B. A Model of Individual Carbon Dioxide Emissions
Not surprisingly, given the lack of attention to individuals' contri-
butions to global warming, policymakers and scholars have developed
few tools to assess the aggregate contribution of individual behavior
to greenhouse gas emissions.65 To evaluate whether the carbon emis-
EIA, 2004 REVIEw]; see also EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND
SINKS: 1990-2004, at 2-22 to 2-26 (2006), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/
globalwarming.nsf/UniqueKeyLookup/RAMR6MBSC3/$File/O6_CompleteReport.pdf
[hereinafter EPA, 2006 INVENTORY] (offering similar breakdown of emissions source
categories).
63 UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, KEY GREEN-
HOUSE GAS DATA 44-45 figs.II-12 to 11-20 (2005), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/
docs/publications/key-ghg.pdf.
64 See Paul C. Stern et al., Strategies for Setting Research Priorities, in ENVIRONMEN-
TALLY SIGNIFICANT CONSUMPTION: RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 124, 133 (Paul C. Stern et al.
eds., 1997) (noting that in analyzing sources of pollution "[o]ne useful strategy is to begin
with possible policy interventions").
65 For models of the environmental impact of individuals' behavior as consumers, see
MICHAEL BROWER & WARREN LEON, THE CONSUMER'S GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE ENVIRON-
MENTAL CHOICES: PRACTICAL ADVICE FROM THE UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS
216-48 (1999), and Shui Bin & Hadi Dowlatabadi, Consumer Lifestyle Approach to U.S.
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sions from individual behavior are worthy of regulatory attention, we
present the results of a model that estimates the carbon dioxide emis-
sions in 2000 from the average individual in the United States and the
aggregate emissions from all individuals. 66 We provide an overview of
the model here and a detailed description in the Appendix.
1. Individual Behavior Defined
We define individual behavior to include only those behaviors
that are under the direct, substantial control of the individual and that
are not undertaken in the scope of the individual's employment. As a
result, we include emissions from personal motor vehicle use, personal
air travel, and mass transport. We exclude emissions from motor
vehicle use and air travel undertaken in the course of employment
(e.g., driving for a delivery service or flying on a business trip). Simi-
larly, we include emissions attributable to household electricity use,
but we exclude emissions attributable to the industrial production of
household goods (e.g., the emissions resulting from the production,
shipping, and retailing of appliances and food).
Although this conservative approach excludes many activities
that contribute to climate change (e.g., the releases attributable to
household appliance production), the emissions from these activities
often vary widely depending on where and how the goods are pro-
duced, and the degree of individual control over them is often very
limited.67 Furthermore, making individuals responsible for all emis-
sions derived from consumer choices would make it possible to attri-
bute virtually all emissions to individuals, yet it would not satisfy the
initial objective of including only emissions that can be changed
Energy Use and the Related C0 2 Emissions, 33 ENERGY POL'Y 197 (2005). Our model
does not consider the impact of individuals' consumer behavior, see infra note 67, but
instead examines the emissions attributable to all behavior under an individual's direct
control.
66 We look exclusively at carbon dioxide because approximately 85% of climate forcing
is caused by carbon dioxide, see supra note 18, and the data on carbon dioxide are more
accessible and reliable across source categories than data on other greenhouse gases.
67 Experts disagree as to whether the carbon dioxide that results from the manufacture
of consumed products should count towards an individuals' emissions. Compare The Per-
sonal Environmental Impact Calculator, http://ans.engr.wisc.edu/eic/home.html (last vis-
ited Oct. 12, 2007) (limiting calculations of individuals' environmental impact to activities
over which they have direct control, including transportation choices, recycling habits,
home water use, and home energy use), with BROWER & LEON, supra note 65, at 14
("[Wie vote with our dollars when we choose to buy or not to buy particular products.").
Our rationale for including electricity purchased by consumers in the model, but excluding
other consumer goods, is consumers' uncertainty regarding the carbon releases from those
other goods. For example, it may be difficult for a consumer to know how the emissions
from the purchase of a pound of organic chicken from a distant poultry farm compare to
the emissions from a pound of pork from a local farm.
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through laws and policies directed at individual behavior. 68 For ease
of analysis, we divide the emissions from individual behavior into
household and transportation emissions.
a. Household Emissions
We estimate household emissions by using both top-down and
bottom-up approaches. 69 For the top-down approach, we calculate
household energy consumption using EIA data for residential fuel
consumption.70 We then convert household energy use into individual
energy use. We use U.S. Census data indicating that the U.S. popula-
tion in 2000 was roughly 281 million, and our calculation that the
United States had just under 109 million households.
71
We divide household energy use into two categories: primary use
and electricity use. The primary use category includes household
energy consumption that does not require an external power genera-
tion source. Examples include space and water heaters, washing
machines, and stoves that utilize coal, natural gas, petroleum, or
wood. The EIA provides data on primary use.72 Using EIA conver-
sion coefficients, 73 we convert these forms of energy use into the
amount of carbon dioxide emitted per household and per person.
We next obtain the total residential electricity use for 2000 using
EIA data.74 We convert this electricity use into carbon emissions
using the EIA coefficients, accounting for the fuel type used in the
electricity generation. For example, electricity generated from fossil
fuels generates carbon dioxide emissions, but sources such as nuclear
energy and hydropower do not. We then calculate the total amount of
68 See Vandenbergh, supra note 57, at 539 (arguing that including all emissions gener-
ated in course of individuals' employment or in production of consumer goods and services
would negate category's utility by enabling all pollution to be attributed to individuals).
69 See infra app.
70 EIA, 2004 REVIEW, supra note 62, at 39.
71 The U.S. Census Bureau states that there were 281,421,906 persons in the United
States in 2000 and an average household size of 2.59 persons per household. U.S. Census
Bureau, American Factfinder, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/GCTrable?-bm=y&-geo
_id=01000US&-_box-head-nbr=GCT-H6&-dsname=DEC 2000 SF1 U&-format=US-9
(last visited Aug. 8, 2007). Dividing the total population by persons per household returns
108.7 million households.
72 EIA, 2004 REVIEW, supra note 62, at 39.
73 See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, LONG FORM FOR VOLUNTARY
REPORTING OF GREENHOUSE GASES: INSTRUCTIONS 47-48 (2006), available at ftp://
ftp.eia.doe.gov/pub/oiaf/1605/cdrom/pdf/FormEIA-1605_2005_Instructions.pdf [herein-
after EIA, LONG FORM] (listing coefficients used to determine amount of carbon dioxide
generated by various fuels).
74 EIA, 2004 REVIEW, supra note 62, at 39.
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carbon dioxide emissions from electricity consumption in pounds per
household and pounds per individual.
75
To validate the top-down approach, we also calculate household
carbon dioxide emissions using a bottom-up approach. We use EIA
data on end-use electricity consumption for households in 2001 (2000
data were unavailable). 76 For large numbers of household appliances,
EIA data include the average use per household in kilowatt hours and
the number of households utilizing these appliances. Thus, we can
determine the amount of carbon dioxide emission-producing elec-
tricity used by each appliance and convert these values into total
carbon dioxide emissions, emissions per household, and emissions per
individual using the EIA conversion coefficients.
Our individual figure is a blended individual average that allo-
cates to every person a share of carbon dioxide emissions regardless of
behavior.77 The totals for the top-down and bottom-up approaches
are remarkably similar, suggesting that the household estimate is reli-
able. We use the top-down approach in calculating the overall indi-
vidual total.
b. Transportation Emissions
We divide individual transportation into three categories: auto-
motive, air, and other.78 We include in the automotive category all
personal vehicle use. We include in the air transportation category all
air travel except business travel and freight. We assign rail and mass
transit to the "other" category.
We translate EIA data on motor fuel consumed by personal
vehicle use 79 into pounds of carbon dioxide using the same conversion
factors used in the household calculations,80 and we then convert the
totals into pounds per person. We calculate emissions for domestic
passenger air travel by multiplying energy intensity per passenger mile
by the total number of domestic passenger miles,81 after reducing the
75 We do not account for inefficiency in electricity generation and line loss, making
individuals responsible only for their direct energy consumption.
76 See Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep't of Energy, Electricity Consumption by End
Use in U.S. Households, 2001, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/reps/enduse/erOlus tabl.
html [hereinafter EIA, End Use] (last visited Aug. 30, 2007).
77 See infra app.
78 See infra app.
79 EIA, 2004 REVIEW, supra note 62, at 57.
80 EIA, LONG FORM, supra note 73, at 47-48.
81 BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., NATIONAL TRANSPORTA-
TION STATISTICS 2003 tbl.4-21 (2004), available at http://www.bts.gov/publications/
nationaltransportation-statistics/2003.
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total number of miles to exclude business travel.82 We convert the
resulting figure into total pounds of carbon dioxide for all passenger
air travel using the EIA coefficients. We then divide the total by the
U.S. population to yield pounds of carbon dioxide per person. We
calculate the rail and mass transit totals using a similar approach,
although we do not reduce these totals for business travel.
2. Results
Table 1 presents the results of the individual behavior model. As
it indicates, by merely including the behaviors over which individuals
have direct, substantial control, the total emissions for the average
American in 2000 equaled over 14,000 pounds (seven tons) of carbon
dioxide.
TABLE 1: INDIVIDUAL CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS









Total (Mean Individual) 14,523
Total (All Individuals) 4.1 trillion
The total emissions for all 281 million Americans in 2000 was 4.1
trillion pounds. If calculated using 2006 data, the figure would likely
be higher. The U.S. population reached roughly 300 million in 2006,83
while per-capita emissions have decreased only slightly since 2000.8 4
82 Seventy-seven percent of passengers reported that their most recent air travel was
for nonbusiness purposes. Bureau of Transp. Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Transp., Airline Pas-
senger Travel, OMNISTATS, Sept. 2003, at 1, 2, available at http://www.bts.gov/publications/
omnistats/volume_03_issue03/pdflentire.pdf.
83 As of July 1, 2006, the U.S. Census Bureau estimated the U.S. population at
298,217,000. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
2007, at 8 (2006), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2OO6pubs/O7statab/pop.pdf.
84 The EIA reports that per-capita CO 2 emissions in the United States were 20.60
metric tons in 2000. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, WORLD PER CAPITA
CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS FROM THE CONSUMPTION AND FLARING OF FOSSIL FUELS,
1980-PRESENT (2006), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/iea/carbon.html. The EIA
recently issued a press release estimating 2006 carbon dioxide emissions at 5877 million
metric tons. Press Release, Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep't of Energy, U.S. Carbon
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C. Implications
Although the 4.1 trillion pound total is a tremendous amount, its
importance is even more apparent in context. The 4.1 trillion pounds
emitted by individuals constitute 32% of the roughly 12.7 trillion
pounds emitted annually in the United States.85 By comparison, the
entire industrial sector released 3.9 trillion pounds in 2000.86 The indi-
vidual behavior figures also dwarf the subsectors that constitute the
industrial sector.87 For example, the chemical-manufacturing and
petroleum-refining industries, which were the top emitters among the
manufacturing industries, emitted 686 billion pounds and 672 billion
pounds of carbon, respectively, in 2002.88 Other industrial sectors had
even lower totals, including iron and steel production (143.9 billion
pounds), cement manufacture (90.8 billion), and aluminum produc-
tion (13.7 billion).
89
Even more striking is the comparison of emissions from indi-
vidual behavior in the United States with other sources worldwide.
The United States released 24.4% of the world's carbon dioxide in
2000,90 suggesting that individual behavior in the United States
accounted for roughly 8% of the world's carbon dioxide emissions.
The significance of the 8% is clear when compared to the emissions of
other continents and countries. The 4.1 trillion pounds attributable to
Dioxide Emissions from Fossil Fuels Declined by 1.3 Percent in 2006 (May 23, 2007), avail-
able at http://www.eia.doe.gov/neic/press/press284.html. Dividing 5877 million metric tons
by the 2006 population estimate of 298,217,000, see supra note 83, yields per-capita emis-
sions of 19.70 metric tons of carbon dioxide.
85 See World Res. Inst., Climate Analysis Indicators Tool Version 4.0, http://cait.wri.org/
cait.php?page=gases (last visited Aug. 31, 2007) (requires log-in registration) (providing
total of 5,791.1 mega tons, or 12.7 trillion pounds, of U.S. emissions).
86 See EIA, 2004 REVIEW, supra note 62, at 341 (listing emissions for industrial sector).
The 32% share for individual behavior compares favorably to an estimate that households
accounted for 32.4% of direct U.S. energy use in 2000, GERALD T. GARDNER & PAUL C.
STERN, ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 258 tbl.10-1 (2d ed. 2002),
and to a study that concluded that individual behavior consumed roughly one-third of U.S.
energy and accounted for roughly 40% of U.S. carbon dioxide emissions in 1997, Bin &
Dowlatabadi, supra note 65, at 205.
87 See EIA, 2004 REVIEW, supra note 62, at 386 (defining industrial sector in detail).
88 See id. at 345 tbl.12-4 (giving energy consumption for manufacturing industries using
data from 2000 in metric tons, which we converted to pounds).
89 See EPA, 2006 INVENTORY, supra note 62, at 2-7 tbl.2-4 (using data from 2000 in
metric tons, which we converted to pounds).
90 See EIA, 2004 REVIEW, supra note 62, at 335 tbl.11.19. The United States' contribu-
tion of carbon dioxide emissions to the world total decreased from 24.4% in 2000 to 23.1%
in 2003. Id. This reduction appears to be largely due to an increase of emissions from
China. Over this period, U.S. emissions decreased by 13 million tons, a 0.002% decrease,
while China's emissions increased by 508 million tons, or 16.7%. Id. A recent report by
the Netherlands Environment Assessment Agency concluded that China passed the
United States in 2006 as the world's largest emitter of carbon dioxide. Graphic Detail,
China Overtakes US in C0 2 Emissions, 447 NATURE 1038, 1038 (2007).
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U.S. individual behavior is larger than the total for sub-Saharan
Africa (1.1 trillion pounds), South America (1.6 trillion), and Central
America (1.0 trillion, including the Caribbean) combined, and it is
roughly a third of all carbon dioxide emissions in Asia (15.6 trillion)
and Europe (12.1 trillion). 91
As Table 2 demonstrates, the emissions by U.S. individuals also
are larger than the total emissions from every other nation but China.
TABLE 2: Top TEN NATIONS BY 2000 CARBON
DIOXIDE EMISSIONS
9 2
Country Emissions (in billions of lbs.)
United States 11,582
China 6938









EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS FROM INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR
The model results demonstrate the substantial contribution of
individual behavior to carbon dioxide emissions on both an average
and aggregate basis. Indeed, the emissions are so large that every 1%
decrease in emissions from individual behavior represents a reduction
of roughly forty-one billion pounds of carbon dioxide. Individual
behavior changes thus have the potential to contribute significantly to
the reductions needed to reduce the risk of catastrophic climate
change. 9
3
91 World Res. Inst., supra note 85. The conversion was performed by multiplying the
data available in tons from the Climate Analysis Indicators Tool by 2000 pounds per ton.
92 The data in this table were gathered from World Res. Inst., supra note 85. All
figures were converted from tons to pounds by multiplying by 2000 pounds per ton.
93 Individual behavior change is an important explicit and implicit part of the "stabiliza-
tion wedges" approach to emissions reductions proposed by Stephen Pacala and Robert
Socolow. See Pacala & Sokolow, supra note 51, at 968 (emphasizing human action over
reliance on advancement in emission-reducing technologies). They have argued that emis-
sions reductions should be approached by thinking of the reductions as a series of wedges,
with each wedge representing an activity that reduces carbon emissions by zero in 2004 but
increasing in linear fashion each year for fifty years. Id. By the year 2054, each wedge
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If policymakers are to respond to the emissions from individual
behavior appropriately, however, they need to know which individual
behaviors to target. The targeting problem requires policymakers to
identify the behaviors that cause the greatest emissions, those that are
most easily changed, and the optimal regulatory instruments for
affecting emitting behaviors. This Part explores the first and second
issues, while Parts IV and V explore the third issue.
A. Behavior Types
Individual behaviors differ based on the quantity of carbon emis-
sions they generate and the barriers to their change. A number of
behaviors yield a disproportionate share of the total carbon dioxide
emissions. Although the model provides a first step in identifying
these behaviors, more fine-grained work remains to be done. Unfor-
tunately, much of the literature on the contributions from individual
behavior is woefully out of date. After a burst of research focused on
household energy use in the late 1970s and early 1980s, such studies in
the academic literature in the United States largely disappeared.94
For now, all we can do is use the new model and earlier studies to give
an initial indication of the types of behavior changes that are most
likely to yield large emissions reductions. In most cases, energy use
has a direct relationship to carbon emissions because the energy is
generated from fossil fuels, and thus we -treat energy-consuming
behaviors as carbon-emitting behaviors here.
The optimal regulatory response requires that we account not
only for the size of the emissions from a particular behavior but also
for the barriers to behavior change. Social psychologists use several
categories to distinguish among behaviors. For example, Paul Stern
and colleagues identify three principal types of environmental
behavior: consumer (e.g., purchasing a fuel-efficient car or appli-
ance), direct (e.g., changing one's driving style or turning off lights),
represents one billion tons of reduced carbon emissions. Id. Pacala and Socolow identify
fifteen approaches that each can generate a stabilization wedge. Id. at 969-71, 970 tbl.1.
Although the focus of many of their wedges is on the new deployment of existing industrial
technologies, several also explicitly involve lifestyle changes. For example, a wedge is
available from reducing the average annual miles traveled by cars from 10,000 to 5000. Id.
at 969. Another wedge is available from pursuing "known and established approaches" to
more efficient heating and cooling, water heating, lighting, and refrigeration in commercial
and residential buildings, which implies that consumers will purchase more efficient goods.
Id.
94 See NRC, DECISION MAKING, supra note 6, at 81 (noting lack of funding for studies
on social influences on energy consumption after early 1980s); see also Telephone Inter-
view with Paul C. Stern, Staff Dir., Nat'l Research Council, in Wash., D.C. (Dec. 14, 2006)
(describing resumption of interest in household energy consumption as "Rip Van Winkle
experience") (notes on file with the New York University Law Review).
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and civic (e.g., voting, writing to a policymaker, or joining a civic
group). 95 Of these, consumer behavior is often the most resistant to
change.
96
Similarly, social psychologists distinguish between conservation
behaviors (e.g., turning down thermostats) and efficiency-enhancing
behaviors (e.g., purchasing more efficient motor vehicles and home
appliances). 97 Conservation behaviors typically involve high-visibility
actions that are intuitively the most appealing for psychologists to
study but that require frequent action and ongoing behavior modifica-
tion. Efficiency-enhancing behaviors often involve one-time con-
sumer choices, such as motor vehicle purchases, that are often
overlooked by psychologists. A leading assessment of this research
concludes that many of the largest gains are achievable from effi-
ciency-enhancing behaviors, 98 but that efforts directed at carbon emis-
sions reductions should not ignore conservation behaviors either.
Unfortunately, efficiency-enhancing behaviors are often consumer
behaviors and thus may be particularly resistant to change.99
In contrast to the approach taken by psychologists, the rational-
actor theorists who study law and social norms focus on the payoffs of
behavior change to the individual.100 These theorists typically suggest
that optimal regulatory policies change the individual's opportunity
set through taxes, subsidies, efficiency standards for consumer prod-
ucts, and other traditional measures. They reason that many behavior
changes have a positive payoff for the individual, and that a rational
actor-in theory-should change behavior in response to information
about its payoff. Even these nominally positive-payoff behaviors,
however, often face important barriers. Information may not be avail-
able or may not be noticed or understood by the individual. The indi-
vidual may have adequate information but may act habitually without
95 Paul C. Stern et al., A Value-Belief-Norm Theory of Support for Social Movements:
The Case of Environmentalism, 6 HUM. ECOLOGY REV. 81, 82 (1999).
96 See Paul C. Stern, Information, Incentives, and Proenvironmental Consumer
Behavior, 22 J. CONSUMER POL'Y 461, 461-63 (1999) (emphasizing numerous external con-
straints on consumer behavior). Habits, inconvenience, and resource restraints may be
important barriers to consumer behavior change. See GARDNER & STERN, supra note 86,
at 111-12, 162-63 (noting examples where programs making conservation more convenient
increased proenvironmental behavior); NRC, DECISION MAKING, supra note 6, at 78-79
(pointing to studies finding constraints on consumer behavior).
97 See Paul C. Stern & Gerald T. Gardner, Psychological Research and Energy Policy,
36 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 329, 333-34 (1981) (noting distinction between constant "curtail-
ment" behavior and one-time "efficiency" behavior).
98 Id. at 331-34.
99 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
100 See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 6, at 1235 (criticizing overemphasis on social norms to
solve environmental problems).
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engaging cognitive processes. The individual may have adequate
information, but her cognitive processes may suffer from bounded
rationality. Even if monetary benefits will exceed costs, the effort
necessary to change the behavior may outweigh such benefits. Social
costs may tip a seemingly positive-payoff behavior into negative terri-
tory. Some behavior changes may be impossible for the individual
because the necessary infrastructure or financial resources are not
available. Other behaviors are possible but require sacrifice by the
individual.
Far more work remains to be done to understand the economic,
legal, and social influences on individuals' emissions-causing behav-
iors. For the purposes of this analysis, we identify emissions from
individual behavior in several ways. We first identify the largest emit-
ting behaviors regardless of the difficulty of behavior change. We
then identify a number of "low-hanging fruit" behaviors that the psy-
chological and legal literatures suggest are likely to confront the
fewest barriers to change.
B. High-Yielding Behaviors
The model demonstrates that transportation accounts for 9107
pounds of carbon dioxide per person (63% of total annual emis-
sions),1°1 and that personal motor vehicle use accounts for the vast
majority of that total. The model results also highlight the importance
of both total miles driven and vehicle choice. For example, a 10%
reduction in personal vehicle miles traveled would reduce aggregate
emissions from all individual behavior by roughly 225 billion pounds,
or 6% of vehicle emissions. This reduction dwarfs the total emissions
for many industrial sectors, such as iron and steel (144 billion pounds),
cement manufacturing (90.8 billion), and petrochemical production
(6.6 billion). 102 Similarly, the model demonstrates that sport utility
vehicles (SUVs) are responsible for roughly one-third more carbon
dioxide emissions than their proportionate share of all personal motor
vehicles. 10 3 Changes in consumer vehicle selection thus also could
101 See supra tbl.1.
102 EPA, 2006 INVENTORY, supra note 62, at 2-7 tbl.2-4. We convert gigagrams (Gg) to
pounds. One Gg is equal to 1100 tons, or 2.2 million pounds.
103 See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, DOE/EIA-0464 (2005), HOUSE-
HOLD VEHICLES ENERGY USE: LATEST DATA & TRENDS 53-56 tbl.A1 (2005), available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/rtecs/nhts-survey/2001/index.html (using 2001 data demon-
strating that SUVs comprise 12% (23.2 million) of total of 191 million vehicles in personal
motor vehicle inventory but emit 16% (364 million of 2213 billion pounds) of all carbon
dioxide from personal motor vehicles, or 35% more than their share of personal motor
vehicle inventory).
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have large effects on the total emissions attributable to individual
behavior.
The model also demonstrates that household activities account
for 5416 pounds, or 37%, of emissions from the mean individual,
much of which arises from appliance use. Based on the EIA data that
formed the basis of our bottom-up analysis for households,'10 4 the top
eight categories of appliances in terms of total carbon emissions are
refrigeration/freezing (89.2 billion pounds), air conditioning (83.2 bil-
lion), space heating (52.8 billion), water heating (47.6 billion), lighting
(46 billion), home electronics (37.6 billion), clothes drying (30.2 bil-
lion), and stoves/ovens (24.2 billion).' 0 5
In a prior work, Gerald Gardner and Paul Stern identified the
steps that would generate the largest reductions in energy consump-
tion. We list their top fifteen steps in Table 3. Although Gardner and
Stern conducted their work in the early 1980s, it provides the best
analysis available of the highest-yielding behavior changes. 10 6
Taken together, the model results and the Gardner and Stern
analysis demonstrate that there is no shortage of plausible behavior
changes that could yield large emissions reductions. In fact, the list
demonstrates that relatively minor steps could reduce the contribution
of emissions from individual behavior by almost two-thirds. Some of
the behaviors identified by Gardner and Stern will be difficult to
change, however, because they have negative monetary or psychic
payoffs for the individual, require substantial upfront expenditures, or
face other barriers. Below we focus on the behaviors that are most
amenable to change.
C. Low-Hanging Fruit
We describe behavior changes that have positive monetary
payoffs for the individual and that require little effort or sacrifice to
implement as changes to "low-hanging-fruit" behaviors. These behav-
iors do not require significant upfront financial expenditure or sophis-
ticated cognitive processing, and they are not subject to major
expenditures of effort or psychic cost. Behaviors with these qualities
should be the most malleable.
104 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
105 EIA, End Use, supra note 76. The data are for 2001 but should closely resemble
2000 data. It is important to assess emissions from production of new products, but esti-
mates are not available for many household products. We have assumed that products will
be replaced as existing equipment wears out.
106 GARDNER & STERN, Supra note 86, at 259-60 tbl.10-3.
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TABLE 3: Top FIFTEEN STEPS FOR REDUCING
TOTAL HOUSEHOLD ENERGY CONSUMPTION
Transportation Activity Energy Reduction
Buy More Efficient Car 20%
Carpool with Two Others 4-6%
Cut Shopping Trips by Half 2%
Alter Driving Habits 2%
Get Frequent Tune-ups 2%
Maintain Tire Pressure 1%
Subtotal 31-33%
Household Activity Energy Reduction
Insulate and Weatherize House 10%
Install More Efficient Heating Equipment 8%
Reduce Inside Temp. from 72°F to 68°F Days, 65°F Nights 4%
Install More Efficient Water Heater 2%
Install More Efficient Refrigerator/Freezer 1.6%
Water Heat Reduced by 20'F 1%
Change Half of Bulbs to Fluorescent 1%
Install More Efficient Stove 0.9%
Install More Efficient Air Conditioner 0.7%
Subtotal 29.2%
Total 60.2-62.2%
Table 3 above includes a number of easily changed behaviors in
the transportation and household areas, such as altering driving
habits, maintaining tire pressure, and changing to fluorescent bulbs.
Each of these behaviors accounts for at least 1% of the aggregate
emissions from individual behavior. Thus, changing any one behavior
could generate reductions of up to forty-one billion pounds of carbon
dioxide-more than the amount emitted by many entire industry sec-
tors. Numerous other behavior changes can have meaningful effects,
such as using low-flow showerheads (to reduce hot water use),
10 7
107 See GARDNER & STERN, supra note 86, at 113 (noting that program giving away low-
flow showerheads proved effective because it combined convenience with provision of free
goods).
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reducing electricity "leakage,"' 108 and opting to fly in the daytime
rather than at night. 10 9
Although numerous other low-hanging-fruit behaviors are
worthy of study and attention by policymakers, we demonstrate the
importance of these behaviors by focusing on one unlikely source of
massive emissions: idling by personal motor vehicles. Remarkably
little has been published about optimal idling times and the emissions
reductions that could be achieved by reducing idling. Regulators have
focused on heavy-truck idling in recent years because of its contribu-
tion to smog,110 but they have focused almost no attention on carbon
dioxide emissions from personal-vehicle idling. Not surprisingly,
given the lack of regulatory attention, little research is available on
these emissions. One recent study concluded that many people
believe that they should allow their cars to idle for several minutes
during a cold start in the winter, and that idling is usually more fuel
efficient than stopping and restarting the engine. 1 Car design has
improved dramatically, however, and one regulatory agency now rec-
ommends idling for no longer than thirty seconds for a winter start
and no longer than ten seconds in general driving conditions. 1 2
108 Electricity use by appliances that are turned off but still plugged in may amount to
5% of household electricity use in the United States and may cost consumers over $3.5
billion annually. JENNIFER THORNE & MARGARET Suozzo, AM. COUNCIL FOR AN
ENERGY EFFICIENT ECON., LEAKING ELECTRICITY: STANDBY AND OFF-MODE POWER
CONSUMPTION IN CONSUMER ELECTRONICS AND HOUSEHOLD APPLIANCES 1 (1998).
109 Airplane contrails trap the heat radiating from the earth at night, but during the day
they both trap the earth's heat and reflect the radiant energy from the sun. See David J.
Travis et al., Contrails Reduce Daily Temperature Range, 418 NATURE 601, 601 (2002)
(explaining that contrails reduce both "solar and outgoing" heat transfer).
110 See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Idling Reduction: National Transportation Idle-Free
Corridors, http://www.epa.gov/smartwaylogistics/idling.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2007)
(identifying harms from truck idling).
111 See McKENZIE-MOHR Assocs., EARTHCARE SUDBURY, ANTI-IDLING FINAL
REPORT 7-8, 13 (2003), available at http://www.city.greatersudbury.on.ca/content/
divearthcare/documents/sudbury-finalreport.pdf [hereinafter MMA, IDLING] (noting that
survey participants believed that they could idle their vehicle for three minutes before they
began using more fuel than they would by stopping and starting); MCKENZIE-MOHR
AsSOCS. ET AL., BARRIERS TO INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPATION IN GREENHOUSE GAS REDUC-
TION ACTiVITIES-AN EVALUATION 40-41 (2006), available at http://oee.nrcan.gc.ca/
transportation/idling/material/reports-research/barriers-1999-report.cfm?attr=16 [herein-
after MMA, BARRIERS] (noting consistent findings of idling misinformation).
112 Office of Energy Efficiency, Natural Res. Can., Idling: Myths Versus Reality, http://
oee.nrcan.gc.ca/communities-government/transportation/municipal-communities/artices/
idling-myths.cfm?attr=8 (last visited Aug. 16, 2007). These recommendations are consis-
tent with those of many automakers. For example, a British owner's manual for the 2006
Mercedes-Benz C-Class advises drivers to "[s]witch off the engine in stationary traffic" and
to "not warm up the engine with the vehicle stationary." Mercedes-Benz, Interactive
Owner's Manual: C-Class Coupe, Introduction Section: Protection of the Environment,
http://www4.mercedes-benz.com/e/cars/c-class-c/betriebsanleitung/vertiefen/NIOlFl.html
(last visited Oct. 17, 2007). A Nissan manual advises drivers to "[a]llow the engine to idle
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Idling for longer periods burns more fuel, releasing carbon
dioxide into the atmosphere. It also may cause more harm to the
engine than turning it on and off.113 Idling often occurs in situations
in which it is safe and convenient to turn off the vehicle.1 1 4 As a
result, a reduction in idling may not only reduce emissions but may
also have net benefits to the individual from reduced engine wear and
fuel consumption.
11 5
To assess the emissions reductions that could be achieved from
changing idling behavior, we estimate the total amount of carbon
dioxide emitted from personal motor vehicle idling in the United
States. Although complete data are not available on idling behavior
in America, a study has examined idling behavior in Canada.11 6 If
Americans have the same personal motor vehicle idling patterns as
Canadians, then the 191 million drivers in the United States in 2000117
released 45.9 billion pounds of carbon dioxide from cold-start idling
and 22.9 billion pounds from idling while waiting, for a total of more
than 68 billion pounds.1 8 Even if we assume that the Canadian
for at least 30 seconds after starting" but also advises drivers to "[a]void unnecessary
engine idling." NISSAN USA, 2006 NISSAN ALTIMA OWNER'S MANUAL 5-6, 5-15 to -16
(2005), available at http://www.courtesyparts.com/nissan-manual/pdf/2006-Nissan-Altima
.pdf; see also OFFICE OF MOBILE SOURCES, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA
420-F-93-002, YOUR CAR AND CLEAN AIR: WHAT YOU CAN Do TO REDUCE POLLUTION
3 (1994), available at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/consumer/18-youdo.pdf (emphasizing that
car owners need not warm up cold engines and should not idle longer than thirty seconds).
113 See Office of Energy Efficiency, supra note 112 ("The notion that idling is good for
your vehicle is pass6-in fact, it hasn't been the right thing to do since the advent of elec-
tronic engines. The truth is that excessive idling can damage the engine.").
114 Canadian drivers reported idling their vehicles for the longest average periods of
time when picking up friends or family members (233 seconds), when waiting at a fast-food
or ATM drive-through window (160 seconds), and when waiting in the household driveway
for a family member (139 seconds). MMA, IDLING, supra note 111, at 7.
115 Office of Energy Efficiency, Natural Res. Can., Idling and Climate Change Go Hand
in Hand, http://www.oee.nrcan.gc.ca/transportation/idling/issues/why-idling-problem.cfm?
(last visited Sept. 1, 2007).
116 We identify the amount of carbon dioxide released per second while idling by aver-
aging data provided in Christopher Frey et al., On-Road Measurement of Vehicle Tailpipe
Emissions Using a Portable Instrument, 53 J. AIR & WASTE MGMT. 992, 999 (2003). We
then develop estimates of the amount of idling per week that occurs from individuals
warming their vehicles from a cold start (6.5 minutes) and from individuals idling while
waiting (3.25 minutes). We base our estimates on a Canadian survey that reports an
average of 4.2 idling events per week at an average of 6.2 minutes per event, for a total of
26 minutes per week for individuals warming their vehicles from a cold start. MMA, BAR-
RIERS, supra note 111, at 37-38. The Canadian survey finds an average of 2.5 idling events
per week at an average of 5.2 minutes per event, for a total of 13 minutes per week for
individuals idling while waiting. Id. at 39. We multiply both values by the carbon dioxide
released per second and convert the results into pounds per year.
117 FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEPr. OF TRANSP., HIGHWAY STATISTICS 2000 (2001),
available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/hsOO/dlchrt.htm.
118 See supra note 102.
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figures far overestimate idling in the United States, if Americans idle
75% less than Canadians, for instance, then Americans' personal
motor vehicle idling in 2000 released 11.4 billion pounds of carbon
dioxide from cold-start idling and 5.8 billion pounds from idling while
waiting, for a total of 17.2 billion pounds. Using this conservative esti-
mate of a total of 17.2 billion pounds, if Americans could be induced
to idle for only thirty seconds from a cold start and ten seconds while
waiting, 12.8 billion pounds of carbon dioxide emissions could be
eliminated per year. This behavior change also would generate sav-
ings of roughly 640 million gallons of gas.119 The 12.8 billion pound
reduction possible from such a change in idling behavior roughly
equals the total annual emissions from the aluminum production
sector (13.7 billion pounds), and it exceeds the total emissions from
industry sectors such as soda-ash manufacturing (9.2 billion) and
petrochemical production (6.6 billion).120 The reduction also exceeds
the total annual emissions from countries such as Costa Rica (10.6
billion) and Honduras (10.2 billion).
121
In sum, although the model and literature identify only general
information about specific behavior changes, a wide range of low-
hanging-fruit behaviors exist. Many of these are not the highest
carbon-emitting behaviors, but because they are more amenable to
change, they may yield the most substantial reductions in the short
term. Changing these behaviors could be a critical component of the
short- and long-term emissions reductions necessary to reduce the risk
of catastrophic climate change.
IV
THE ROLE OF NORM ACTIVATION
Even if policymakers are aware of the large contributions of
emissions from individual behavior, they still might choose not to reg-
ulate if individual behavior cannot be changed at acceptable levels of
economic or political cost. Skepticism about direct behavior change is
not unfounded: Taxes and direct regulation to reduce the environ-
mental impacts of individual behavior have generated a fierce back-
lash in the past, 122 and-at least on the surface-informational efforts
119 Burning a gallon of gas generates roughly 19.6 pounds of carbon dioxide; thus, a
reduction in idling that generates 12.8 billion pounds of carbon dioxide emissions also
would save roughly 640 million gallons of gasoline.
120 EPA, 2006 INVENTORY, supra note 62, at 2-7 tbl.2-4. Values are given by the
Inventory in gigagrams (Gg). One Gg is equal to 1100 tons, or 2.2 million pounds.
121 World Res. Inst., supra note 85.
122 See Vandenbergh, supra note 57, at 554-56 (describing backlash against motor
vehicle driving restrictions designed to protect environment).
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seem no more promising. In fact, a 2005 report by the National
Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies concluded that
information campaigns often have been "notoriously ineffective.
'123
The nascent regulatory regimes at the federal and state levels largely
reflect this skepticism, seeking to reduce emissions from individual
behavior only indirectly, through traditional regulatory measures such
as emissions caps for industrial sources and efficiency standards for
consumer-product manufacturers. 124 The 2005 NRC report also
reached a second conclusion, however: The problem is not the
inherent weakness of informational efforts, but rather how agencies
implement those efforts and integrate them with other regulations.
125
A range of legal, economic, and social regulatory measures to
reduce emissions from individual behaviors are available to policy-
makers, and a great deal of work remains to be done to evaluate their
costs and benefits. This Part explores one such measure. It draws on
norms theory and empirical studies to demonstrate how dissemination
of information that activates norms can change the low-hanging-fruit
behaviors. Norm activation not only may change low-hanging-fruit
behaviors directly, but it also may be indispensable for changing the
civic behaviors necessary for the adoption of the tax, regulatory, tech-
nology, and infrastructure measures that will influence the more diffi-
cult behaviors to change. To develop effective information-disclosure
measures, policymakers need to know the type of information that is
most likely to activate the norms that influence carbon-emitting
behaviors.
A. Norm Activation
Media reports and commentators often frame environmental
behavior changes as dichotomous choices between all or nothing. In
the "all" category are major lifestyle changes that require massive sac-
rifice by the individual. Not surprisingly, individuals who engage in
these major lifestyle changes are characterized as eccentric and out of
the mainstream. For example, a recent New York Times article
pointed out that actor Ed Begley, Jr., the lead in a new television
reality series about his own life, makes fences out of used milk jugs. 126
123 NRC, DECISION MAKING, supra note 6, at 74.
124 See, e.g., 10 C.F.R. § 430.32(c) (2007) (imposing efficiency standards on manufac-
turers of central air conditioners and heat pumps).
125 NRC, DECISION MAKING, supra note 6, at 74-78.
126 Ginia Bellafante, With Ed, All's Green on the Domestic Front, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5,
2007, at El. Climate-change believers and skeptics both often downplay the role of indi-
vidual behavior. Compare Hansen, supra note 32, at 16 (criticizing one scientist's call for
individual behavior change because "while appropriate," it "diverts attention from the
essential requirement: government leadership"), with Anne Paine, Global Warming Activ-
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In the "nothing" category are those who are unwilling to make the
major lifestyle changes. These individuals are characterized as being
in the mainstream, a little guilty perhaps, but understandably
unwilling to adopt a radical lifestyle change. Begley's new television
series portrays his wife as the mainstream character who would prob-
ably prefer a little less composting, a bigger car, and a house with a
little more square footage.
127
Social psychology research suggests that these characterizations
are remarkably important. Individuals are strongly influenced by
what they perceive to be the behavior of others, a phenomenon
described by Robert Cialdini as a descriptive norm. 2 8 Other studies
corroborate the influence of perceptions that others also are engaging
in a prosocial behavior. 129 Thus, if people perceive carbon-reducing
behavior changes as the exclusive province of eccentric, committed
environmentalists, they will be less likely to engage in those behaviors
themselves. If these carbon-reducing behaviors are perceived as wide-
spread, however, more people are likely to adopt them.
How does behavior change begin and become sufficiently wide-
spread that descriptive-norm effects push it toward a tipping point?
One mechanism is through the activation of injunctive norms.
130
Information that induces individuals to make personal judgments
about what behavior is right or wrong, or what behavior will be
socially sanctioned or rewarded by others, can influence a wide range
of behaviors. To develop effective information-disclosure measures,
policymakers need to know the type of information that is most likely
to activate the norms that influence low-hanging-fruit behaviors and
civic behaviors. Theoretical and empirical studies have identified the
types of information that hold the greatest prospects for such success.
We begin with the theory and then turn to the empirical studies.
ists Unite, TENNESSEAN (Nashville), Jan. 8, 2007, at Al (noting comment from
Conservative Enterprise Institute senior fellow that seeking to induce individual behavior
change to address climate change is "really silly").
127 Bellafante, supra note 126.
128 Robert B. Cialdini et al., A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: A Theoretical
Refinement and Reevaluation of the Role of Norms in Human Behavior, in 24 ADVANCES
IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 201, 203 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1991).
129 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and
Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71 (2003) (discussing "logic of reciprocity," in which those per-
ceiving that others are cooperating will contribute to public goods, while those perceiving
that others are shirking will not cooperate and may engage in costly retaliation); Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, Social Norms from Close-Knit Groups to Loose-Knit Groups, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 359, 366-67 (2003) (introducing "close-knit" and "loose-knit" accounts explaining
cooperative behavior and citing Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 11, 21 (1998), which notes empirical evidence suggesting that people recipro-
cate water conservation efforts of their neighbors).
130 See Cialdini et al., supra note 128, at 203-04, 230-31.
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1. Norms Theory
As one of us has discussed in earlier works, legal scholars and
social psychologists identify two common categories of norms that are
important to understanding norm activation: social norms and per-
sonal norms.13' Social norms are informal obligations that are
enforced through social sanctions or rewards. 132 Personal norms are
informal obligations that are enforced through an internalized sense
of duty to act, as well as guilt or related emotions for a failure to
act. 133 Legal scholars have emphasized that social norms can influ-
ence the utility calculus by affecting the expected costs of a given
behavior, whether in terms of physical effort or monetary or social
costs. 134 For example, one might avoid a behavior with an immediate
positive monetary payoff that violates a social norm out of concern
that social sanctioning will lead to future monetary costs or lost social
opportunities. Similarly, personal norms may influence the utility
calculus. For example, one might weigh the psychic costs and benefits
of some behaviors, such as the guilt of knowing that one acted immor-
ally or the increased esteem of knowing that one acted appropriately
or even altruistically.
135
Norms scholars have begun to converge on several fundamental
understandings regarding norms and norm activation. 136 Most impor-
tant, scholars have maintained that norms include both specific, con-
crete norms and generalized, abstract norms. 137 The abstract norms
or values are internalized, personal norms.1 38 Many of the concrete
norms are also internalized, but some concrete norms may be social
131 See Vandenbergh, supra note 6, at 1104 (distinguishing between personal and social
norms); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: A Testable Typology of Social Norms
in Corporate Environmental Compliance, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 67-72 (2003) (distin-
guishing between internal and external norms). For an overview of norm activation, see
Vandenbergh, supra note 6, at 1120-26.
132 Vandenbergh, supra note 6, at 1120-26.
133 Shalom H. Schwartz, Normative Influences on Altruism, in 10 ADVANCES IN EXPERI-
MENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 221, 231-32 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1977); see also
Richard H. McAdams, Comment: Accounting for Norms, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 625, 631-37
(summarizing recent literature on norms within field of law and economics).
134 See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 6, at 1237-41 (analyzing norms literature and
explaining that norms operate either through "sanctions from others" or through "guilt[]
for failing to conform").
135 See id. at 1238-39 (considering application of personal norms to recycling behavior).
136 E.g., Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L.
REV. 1781, 1781 (2000).
137 E.g., Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96
MICH. L. REV. 338, 340 (1997).
138 Id.
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norms-norms that are followed not because they are internalized by
the individual but because of expected social sanctions or rewards. 139
In a recent climate change study, social psychologists used
phrases such as "I feel personally obliged to save as much energy as
possible" to test for concrete norms. 140 Another social psychological
study identified abstract norms by testing support for terms such as
"preventing pollution" and "conserving natural resources.' 14' In the
legal literature, Richard McAdams has identified the concrete norm
of "friends don't let friends drive drunk" and the abstract norm of "be
a loyal friend."'1
42
Many legal scholars and social psychologists agree that behavior
change frequently arises from shifts in beliefs that connect concrete
and abstract norms.143 For example, the enactment of a law may
change beliefs about the risks of drunk driving, tying the "be a loyal
friend" abstract norm to the concrete norm regarding not letting
friends drive drunk. 144 The belief change may occur because of infor-
mation the individual intuits from the passage of the law or from
information disclosure required by the law (e.g., labeling requirements
or public information campaigns).
45
In the social psychology literature, Paul Stern and colleagues
have proposed a Values-Beliefs-Norms (VBN) theory that is consis-
tent with the legal literature. 146 VBN theory suggests that information
can activate norms and induce behavior change if it creates a new
belief that a value is threatened and that the individual can act to
reduce the threat.147 Perhaps most importantly, VBN theory identi-
fies the specific belief changes that activate norms. The theory sug-
gests that the formation of two types of beliefs increase the likelihood
that a concrete norm will be activated: (1) an awareness of the conse-
quences of the individual's act regarding the objects of an abstract
norm (referred to as "AC"), and (2) an ascription of personal respon-
sibility for causing or preventing those consequences (referred to as
139 Carlson, supra note 6, at 1241.
140 Linda Steg et al., Factors Influencing the Acceptability of Energy Policies: A Test of
VBN Theory, 25 J. ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 415, 419 tbl.2 (2005) (examining environmental
norms and beliefs among 112 Dutch respondents).
141 Stern et al., supra note 95, at 95.
142 McAdams, supra note 137, at 385.
143 E.g., id. at 395-96.
144 Id. at 384-85; see also id. at 407-08 (examining connection between abstract norm of
good parenting and concrete norm of using child safety seat).
145 Id. at 400-08.
146 Stern, supra note 96, at 462-63.
147 Stern et al., supra note 95, at 83-86, 92.
Reprinted With The Permission of New York University School of Law
December 2007]
HeinOnline  -- 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1707 2007
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
"AR"). 148 One recent study evaluated AC regarding climate change
by testing responses to phrases such as "[g]lobal warming is a problem
for society," and "[i]t is not certain whether global warming is a real
problem. '' 149 The study examined the corresponding AR by testing
phrases such as "I feel jointly responsible for global warming," "[m]y
contribution to the energy problem is negligible," and "[i]n principle,
individuals [on] their own cannot contribute to the reduction of
energy problems." 150
The norm activation modeled by Stern involves personal
norms. 151 As a result, if the norm activation process occurs, a sense of
obligation may arise even in the absence of social norm pressures. 152
Of course, the norm activation process also may affect behavior by
changing the individual's perception about the likelihood that others
will be willing to enforce the norm.
153
Legal scholars have developed a robust literature suggesting that
increases in perceptions of social-norm enforcement can then lead to
norm cascades, causing norms to affect large portions of the popula-
tion.154 On the other hand, a sense of obligation may lead to the for-
mation of a behavioral intention without actually changing behavior.
Other barriers may exist, such as the effort involved, a lack of infra-
structure, social costs, or financial costs. 155 Other social norms also
can serve as barriers. As one study noted, someone who grew up in
poverty may want to show that she has "made it" by not being influ-
enced by the cost of home heating, or a business executive may use a
148 Shalom H. Schwartz, Moral Decision Making and Behavior, in ALTRUISM AND
HELPING BEHAVIOR: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF SOME ANTECEDENTS AND
CONSEQUENCES 127, 127-39 (Jacqueline R. Macauley & Leonard Berkowitz eds., 1970);
Stern et al., supra note 95, at 83-86, 92.
149 Steg et al., supra note 140, at 419 tbl.2.
150 Id.; see also Kent D. Van Liere & Riley E. Dunlap, Moral Norms and Environmental
Behavior: An Application of Schwartz's Norm-Activation Model to Yard Burning, 8 J.
APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 174, 178-81 (1978) (examining strength of AR regarding air pollu-
tion from backyard burning).
151 See Vandenbergh, supra note 6, at 1104 (distinguishing social norms and personal
norms).
152 See Paul C. Stern, Toward a Coherent Theory of Environmentally Significant
Behavior, 56 J. Soc. ISSUES 407, 412 (2000) (summarizing literature on how altruistic
behavior occurs in response to personal norms).
153 See McAdams, supra note 137, at 400-07 (noting importance of perceived likelihood
of enforcement).
154 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903,
909 (1996) (defining "norm bandwagons" and "norm cascades").
155 J. Stanley Black et al., Personal and Contextual Influences on Household Energy
Adaptations, 70 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL 3, 11-14 (1985); Stern et al., supra note 95, at 86.
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Numerous empirical studies demonstrate that norm activation
could have a substantial effect on low-hanging-fruit behaviors.
157
Many of the studies on norms and carbon-relevant behaviors involve
household energy use. These studies examine the relationship
between abstract norms favoring environmental protection, beliefs
about energy use, and behaviors related to energy conservation. One
study concluded that a belief that energy conservation has beneficial
environmental effects activated a concrete norm in favor of conserva-
tion.158 Another study concluded that awareness of the social and
environmental consequences of energy conservation decreased energy
use through curtailed activities.1 59 Similarly, a third study concluded
that a proenvironmental norm accounted for 11% of the variation in
energy conservation activities, while the price of energy only
accounted for 2% of the variation.
160
Studies suggest that individuals respond to information not just
about the harms arising from their specific activities but also about the
harms arising from the aggregate activities of all individuals. 161 For
example, a study of utility customers demonstrated that those who felt
156 NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENERGY USE: THE HUMAN DIMENSION 39, 71 (Paul C.
Stern & Elliott Aronson eds., 1984) [hereinafter NRC, ENERGY]. External barriers to
behavioral change may explain the price inelasticity of gasoline. See NAT'L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN BUILDINGS: BEHAVIORAL ISSUES 18-20 (Paul C. Stern
ed., 1985) (examining influence of information on individual energy use); NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, IMPROVING ENERGY DEMAND ANALYSIS 27-42 (Paul C. Stern ed.,
1984) (examining role of price changes as form of information that influences behavior by
gaining individuals' attention and inducing them to reconsider default choices); infra note
198.
157 See NRC, ENERGY, supra note 156, at 73 (concluding that understanding norms is
"useful for forecasting trends in energy consumption" and for "understanding public sup-
port and opposition to energy policies and programs"); Stern et al., supra note 95, at 85-86,
89-90 (concluding that norms influence low-cost behaviors and civic behaviors). But see
H.J. Staats et al., Communicating the Greenhouse Effect to the Public: Evaluation of a
Mass Media Campaign from a Social Dilemma Perspective, 45 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 189 (1996)
(suggesting that knowledge and awareness may be less instrumental in inducing behavioral
change than some expect).
158 J. Stanley Black, Attitudinal, Normative and Economic Factors in Early Response to
an Energy-Use Field Experiment 272-74 (1978) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univer-
sity of Wisconsin-Madison) (on file with University of Wisconsin Library).
159 Black et al., supra note 155, at 17 (concluding that norms have greater influence on
noneconomically constrained behaviors than on economically constrained behaviors).
160 Stern, supra note 96, at 469.
161 See, e.g., Steg et al., supra note 140, at 423 (noting that individuals feel more respon-
sible for environmental consequences when they are aware of those consequences);
Vandenbergh, supra note 6, at 1127-28 ("Several studies of environmental behavior sup-
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that reduced demand would be good for people in general and
believed that "households as a group could make a big difference in
peak demand" reported that they felt a moral obligation to lower elec-
tricity use during periods of peak demand. 162 The study concluded
that the sense of moral obligation was more influential than price, and
that, "In fact, this effect was greater than that of price even when the
price differentials between peak and off-peak hours ranged as high as
8 to 1."163 Other studies have concluded that personal norms are reli-
able predictors of temperature setbacks (lower thermostat settings in
winter).16" Studies in Europe have reached similar conclusions.165
Moreover, an extensive body of research suggests that norm acti-
vation affects recycling behavior, which can reduce individual carbon
emissions by saving energy.166 For example, personal and social norm
effects may explain why recycling programs involving block captains
have more success than programs that do not, increasing recycling by
28%.167 The block leaders may remind individuals of their personal
norms regarding recycling and may call attention to a social norm
regarding recycling. A survey of participants showed that perceptions
of personal and social norms favoring recycling increased in groups
with block leaders but not in the others. 168 Another study found that
personal norms explained 35% of the variance in recycling
behavior.169
port the hypothesis that information about the aggregate effects of individual behavior can
activate norms and change behavior.").
162 NRC, ENERGY, supra note 156, at 72 (citing Black, supra note 158).
163 Id.
164 See Paul C. Stern et al., Responses to Changing Energy Conditions Among
Massachusetts Households, 8 ENERGY 515, 522-23 (1983) (concluding that personal norms
are reliable predictors of temperature setbacks but less reliable predictors of low-cost
actions, such as weather stripping and minor curtailments, and have weakest relationship
to major household investments).
165 See, e.g., Annika M. Nordlund & J6rgen Garvill, Value Structures Behind
Proenvironmental Behavior, 34 ENV'T & BEHAV. 740, 751-54 (2002) (finding relationship
between abstract proenvironmental norms and feelings of obligation to engage in
proenvironmental actions); Steg et al., supra note 140, at 423 (concluding that personal
norms have more influence on less costly behaviors such as recycling and energy policy
changes than on more costly behaviors such as changes in car or subway use).
166 For a recent overview of the recycling literature, see generally P. Wesley Schultz,
Knowledge, Information, and Household Recycling: Examining the Knowledge-Deficit
Model of Behavior Change, in NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NEW TOOLS FOR ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION: EDUCATION, INFORMATION, AND VOLUNTARY MEASURES 67
(Thomas Dietz & Paul C. Stern eds., 2002).
167 GARDNER & STERN, supra note 86, at 88.
168 Id. at 88-89. Focusing an individual's attention on descriptive and injunctive norms
can also influence littering behavior. Cialdini et al., supra note 128, at 206-32.
169 Joanne Vining & Angela Ebreo, Predicting Recycling Behavior from Global and Spe-
cific Environmental Attitudes and Changes in Recycling Opportunities, 22 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1580, 1602 tbl.10 (1992).
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More recently, studies have examined the effects of environ-
mental norms on transportation behaviors. A study by Annika
Nordlund and Jorgen Garvill, for example, concluded that activation
of abstract environmental norms through increased awareness of con-
sequences had a positive effect on willingness to reduce personal car
use.' 70 Other studies have identified more muted environmental
norm effects regarding transportation.
171
A recent analysis by Joni Hersch and W. Kip Viscusi of a survey
of more than 15,000 Europeans demonstrates that individuals who
believe that global warming requires immediate attention are more
likely to reduce their car fuel usage, increase their public transporta-
tion usage, insulate their homes, and reduce their lighting and appli-
ance use. 172 Similarly, individuals who believe that fossil fuels
contribute to global warming are more likely to take the first three
steps, as are those who believe that transport contributes to global
warming. 173 Although the study did not explicitly test the VBN
theory, it concluded that beliefs regarding the harms that may arise
from global warming (awareness of consequences, or AC) and the
linkages between particular individual behaviors or sources and global
warming (ascription of responsibility, or AR) are associated with
energy-saving activities. 174 Conversely, individuals with inaccurate
beliefs about the causes of global warming (such as believing that
nuclear power contributes to climate change) are less likely to take
ameliorative actions.
175
In addition to changing carbon-emitting behaviors, norm activa-
tion can influence civic behaviors, such as voting and joining advocacy
groups. In fact, studies suggest that norm activation often has a
greater effect on civic behavior than on direct or consumer
behavior. 176 For example, one study concluded that norm activation
explains 30% of the variance in environmental citizenship activities,
such as voting or contacting policymakers, but only 19% of the vari-
ance in consumer behavior. 177 Similar conclusions have been reached
170 Annika M. Nordlund & Jorgen Garvill, Effects of Values, Problem Awareness, and
Personal Norm on Willingness to Reduce Personal Car Use, 23 J. ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 339, 345
(2003).
171 See, e.g., GARDNER & STERN, supra note 86, at 103-04, 162 (noting that structural
barriers to transportation choices can impede proenvironmental behavior even when
paired with existence of environmental norms).
172 Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Allocating Responsibility for the Failure of Global
Warming Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1657, 1682-83 (2007).
173 Id. at 1683.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Stern et al., supra note 95, at 91.
177 Id.
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in studies that examined support for energy conservation policies in
Europe. 178 Norm activation thus may be an important foundation for
adoption of more traditional regulatory measures.
B. Norm Activation and Climate Change
The timing and magnitude of the emissions reductions necessary
to achieve the short- and long-term targets discussed earlier in the
Article 179 require that norm activation occur not only among those
who strongly value environmental protection but also among those
who do not. Critics suggest that strategies for regulation built around
personal norms hold little prospect for success because norms differ
widely among individuals, making it difficult to develop generalizable
insights regarding the effects of law on behavior.180 This limitation
can be seen in the norm-activation studies discussed above, which
focused in large part on activating concrete energy-conservation
norms by linking them to abstract norms favoring environmental pro-
tection.1 81 Although environmental protection norms are widespread,
they are not universally held. 182 To influence the behavior of individ-
uals across the political spectrum, norm activation must link concrete
norms favoring carbon-emissions reductions to abstract norms that
are more widespread than environmental protection.
One such norm is the personal responsibility not to harm others.
If the abstract norm of personal responsibility is widespread, and if it
can be tied to a concrete norm of carbon neutrality, large numbers of
individuals may feel an obligation to change their behavior. When
they do, cascades in behavior may arise as individuals perceive that
the personal norms of a few have become widespread social norms.
178 See, e.g., Steg et al., supra note 140, at 421-22 (testing VBN model and concluding
that "the stronger the personal norm, the more people supported policies aimed at
reducing CO 2 emissions").
179 See supra Part I.C.
180 See Posner, supra note 136, at 1786-91 (concluding that personal norms are uncer-
tain dependent variables not valuable for explaining or predicting behavior); Robert E.
Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603,
1638-39 (2000) (noting that norms are highly context-sensitive and vary across particular
environments, populations, and circumstances).
181 See, e.g., Steg et al., supra note 140, at 424 (concluding that biospheric and altruistic
value clusters are distinct, and that biospheric value clusters are associated with
proenvironmental abstract norms); id. at 423 ("VBN theory has been developed to explain
behavior taken with proenvironmental intent. It may well be that behaviors such as car
and subway use are hardly taken with proenvironmental intent.").
182 See NRC, ENERGY, supra note 156, at 64, 71-73 (discussing how variability in per-
sonal values affects energy use); Vandenbergh, supra note 6, at 1119-20 ("[T]he notions
that individuals have an obligation to refrain from pouring toxic chemicals into a stream or
killing bald eagles or other endangered species are widely (although not universally)
held.").
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1. The Abstract Norm of Personal Responsibility
Norm-activation theory suggests that the two types of belief
change (AC and AR) can inform individuals about how an abstract
norm is threatened and can activate a concrete norm to reduce the
threat.183 Given the vast number of people who must change their
behavior, the challenge posed by climate change is to identify abstract
norms that are sufficiently widespread to influence individuals who do
not identify with environmentalism.
The personal responsibility norm appears to be remarkably wide-
spread across the political spectrum, and it resonates even with those
who oppose regulatory solutions to social problems.184 In this Article,
we do not address whether an individual has a moral obligation to
reduce carbon emissions.185 Instead, we demonstrate that the norm of
personal responsibility is widespread and, through belief change, can
be associated with concrete norms that induce carbon-emitting
behavior changes.
The case for the widespread existence of the personal responsi-
bility norm is strong, although its existence is so commonly assumed
that it is rarely tested explicitly. 186 Empirical studies in the psycholog-
ical literature also routinely conclude that personal responsibility has
both personal-norm effects (influencing behavior even in the absence
of social interactions) and social-norm effects (influencing behavior in
183 See supra text accompanying note 174.
184 See, e.g., Sarah Krakoff, Arnold Schwarzenegger and Our Common Future, 53 BunF.
L. REV. 925, 925-26 (2005) (noting that although "he is the antithesis of the stereotype of
the parsimonious environmentalist," California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger has
stated that "the debate is over[, w]e know the science[, w]e see the threat[, a]nd we know
the time for action is now"); Mark Sanford, Op-Ed., A Conservative Conservationist? Why
the Right Needs to Get Invested in the Search for Climate Change Solutions, WASH. POST,
Feb. 23, 2007, at A19 (Republican governor of South Carolina advocating that climate
change debate be reframed to draw on "conservative principles such as responsibility and
stewardship").
185 Whether such a moral obligation exists is a contestable point. See Sinnott-
Armstrong, supra note 12, at 285-304 (surveying general moral principles and concluding
that they do not support derivative moral principle against wasteful driving that emits
greenhouse gases).
186 In the criminal and tort law literatures, scholars routinely use the term, often
assuming that it is almost uniformly held. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C.
Zipursky, Accidents of the Great Society, 64 MD. L. REV. 364, 368 (2005) (discussing role of
responsibility in tort law); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91
Nw. U. L. REV. 453, 468-69 (1997) (discussing role of moral obligation and personal
responsibility in compliance with criminal law). Holly Doremus has noted the importance
of building a sense of "individual responsibility" toward the environment. Holly Doremus,
Shaping the Future: The Dialectic of Law and Environmental Values, 37 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 233, 234, 253-56 (2003).
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social settings). 187 Personal responsibility is associated with the ability
to control behavior, and studies demonstrate not only that individuals
routinely hold themselves out as having the ability to control their
own behavior, 188 but also that they evaluate more highly others who
do the same.
189
Although the broad existence of the personal responsibility norm
suggests that it has enormous potential to affect behavior, the connec-
tion between the norm and individual carbon emissions reductions has
received little attention. An informal examination of Internet post-
ings by conservative and liberal commentators may help explain why.
Personal responsibility is certainly a popular concept among con-
servatives. Conservative commentators have used the term "personal
responsibility" in more than 1300 articles and speeches posted on just
one think tank's website, 190 stressing the importance of personal
responsibility for behaviors that affect health care, welfare, crime,
obesity, social security, and other social issues.191 Not surprisingly, the
phrase "personal responsibility" also has appeared in the titles of leg-
187 See, e.g., Jerald M. Jellison and Jane Green, A Self-Presentation Approach to the
Fundamental Attribution Error. The Norm of Internality, 40 J. PERSONALITY & SoC.
PSYCHOL. 643, 645 (1981) (showing that social approval increases linearly with expressed
internality); Gifford Weary et al., The Attributional Norm of Internality and Depressive
Sensitivity to Social Information, 49 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1283, 1286 (1985)
(concluding that "the greater the personal responsibility accepted by the actor for his out-
come, the more favorably he was evaluated by observer-subjects").
188 See Pascal Pansu & Daniel Gilibert, Effect of Causal Explanations on Work-Related
Judgments, 51 APPLIED PSYCHOL.: AN INT'L REV. 505, 513 (2002) ("[W]hen attempting to
present a favorable self-image, participants selected more internal explanations that were
effort-related than trait-related.").
189 Individuals look more favorably upon others who take personal responsibility for
their behavior, whether in the form of stating that those individuals can control their
behavior (efficacy) or that their actions affect outcomes (locus of control). See, e.g.,
Jellison & Green, supra note 187, at 645 (showing that social approval increases linearly
with expressed internality); Kenneth A. Wallston et al., Hocus-Pocus, the Focus Isn't
Strictly on Locus: Rotter's Social Learning Theory Modified for Health, 16 COGNITIVE
THERAPY & RES. 183, 193-94 (1992) (noting influence of efficacy as well as locus of con-
trol); Weary et al., supra note 187, at 1286 (finding observers evaluate actors more favor-
ably the higher the degree of personal responsibility attributed by the actor).
190 A search in July 2006 using the Google search engine and the search term "personal
responsibility site: Heritage.org" yielded 1330 hits on the website of the Heritage
Foundation, http://www.heritage.org. We did not attempt to develop a denominator for
this figure, and we make no assertion about the relative rate with which conservative and
liberal commentators reference personal responsibility.
191 See, e.g., Dennis Prager, Co-Director, Empower Am., Lecture at the Heritage
Foundation: The American Tradition of Personal Responsibility (Sept. 20, 1994), available
at http://www.heritage.org/Research/PoliticaIPhilosophy/HL515.cfm (arguing that
Founders exhibited commitment to personal responsibility).
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islation, such as the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996.192
Conservative commentators often use the term "personal respon-
sibility" to mean that an individual has an obligation to fend for her-
self in order to avoid calling upon government or community
assistance. 193 In this view, not taking responsibility imposes the costs
of one's behavior on others. Conservative commentators frequently
assert that government policies should be designed to promote per-
sonal responsibility. We found no example, however, where a con-
servative commentator asserted that individuals should take
responsibility for reducing carbon emissions to avoid imposing harms
on others. In fact, we found almost no examples of conservative com-
mentators connecting the concept of personal responsibility with envi-
ronmental protection. 1
94
In contrast to conservative commentators, liberal commentators
do sometimes discuss personal responsibility in connection with the
environment. 195 They often do so, however, in the context of expres-
sing concern that, by focusing on personal responsibility, policymakers
will undermine efforts to assert corporate responsibility.' 96
Liberal commentators tend to focus on the socioeconomic and
physical constraints that limit many individuals' ability to practice per-
sonal responsibility as it is envisioned by conservatives.' 97 Liberals'
reluctance to assign personal responsibility for the environmental
harms caused by individual behavior may arise from the view that
192 Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 8,
21, 25, and 42 U.S.C.).
193 See, e.g., Radley Balko, Beyond Personal Responsibility, CATO INST., May 17, 2004,
http://www.cato.org/pub-display.php?pubid=4530 (criticizing efforts by lawmakers to
expand healthcare coverage).
194 In an op-ed published after we conducted our research, Mark Sanford, the
Republican governor of South Carolina, linked personal responsibility and climate change.
See Sanford, supra note 184 (noting that climate change is causing some people to lose
"their rights and freedoms because of the actions of others").
195 In general, personal responsibility was less commonly referenced by liberal commen-
tators in our study, although we did not attempt to account for the total number of publica-
tions generated. A July 2006 search using the term "personal responsibility" on two liberal
think tanks' websites (the Open Society Institute, http://www.soros.org, and the Center for
American Progress, http://www.americanprogress.org) yielded only ninety-five hits.
196 For example, Ralph Nader's website has argued that although the Republican Party
"routinely calls for personal responsibility on the part of the people, it seems to have little
interest in corporate responsibility." Eroding Americans' Last Defense: The Civil Justice
System, NADER PAGE, Feb. 4, 2005, http://www.nader.org/interest/020405.html.
197 See, e.g., Peter Edelman et al., Reconnecting Disadvantaged Young Men: An Intro-
duction, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS, Jan. 20, 2006, http://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/kfiles/b1549629.html (arguing that social policies must be enacted to widen disad-
vantaged youth's educational and economic opportunities before personal choice has real
value).
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many individuals have insufficient control over the environmental
effects of their behavior to support an obligation to change. This lack
of control regarding climate change can arise from structural limita-
tions. For example, many people live far from their worksite and
shopping areas and do not have access to mass transportation. 198
A second concern of liberal commentators links control with
equity. Many individuals do not have the financial resources to make
the efficiency investments necessary to respond to the personal
responsibility norm.199 Increased energy efficiency costs can cause
individuals to fall below socially acceptable levels of expenditures on
food, health care, and other items.
In our view, conservatives are correct in noting that the personal
responsibility norm is likely to influence behavior and that promoting
the norm is an appropriate concern of government. They fall short,
however, in failing to acknowledge the role of personal responsibility
in ameliorating environmental harms, and climate change in partic-
ular. At the same time, liberals are correct to highlight the impor-
tance of environmental harms and to worry that assertions of personal
responsibility assume unrealistic levels of personal control and could
undercut efforts to regulate corporations. Where liberals fall short is
in failing to acknowledge that individuals do control many activities
that are important contributors to carbon emissions. They also are
too quick to assume that efforts to change individual behavior will
reduce the public appetite for regulatory measures and that these
efforts cannot account for equity concerns.
If our analysis is accurate, the linkage between personal responsi-
bility and carbon neutrality has been ignored because of different
198 Structural limitations may be particularly responsible for the growing inelasticity of
gas consumption. A recent study concluded that the rise in gas prices over the 2001-06
period reduced consumption by only 4%, as compared to the more than 30% reduction
generated by similar increases in 1975-80. Jonathan E. Hughes et al., Evidence of a Shift in
the Short-Run Price Elasticity of Gasoline Demand (Inst. of Transp. Studies, Working
Paper No. UCD-ITS-RR-06-16, 2006), available at http://pubs.its.ucdavis.edu/publication_
detail.php?id=1050; see also NRC, ENERGY, supra note 156, at 39 (noting in 1984 that
"gasoline consumption is more responsive to price signals than energy for residential con-
sumption"). The difference may have been that the U.S. population became much more
suburbanized and reliant on cars between 1975 and 2001. The average annual miles driven
per household increased from 12,036 in 1977 to 21,171 in 2001. Lisa Margonelli, Pipeline
Blog, Who Cares About the Price of Gas?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2007, http://pipeline.blogs.
nytimes.com/2007/01/15/who-cares-about-the-price-of-gas (registration required) (con-
cluding that "we have demonstrated that we can't or won't respond rationally to high
prices, so taxes will not push conservation"). Important structural limitations also exist for
household energy use. Many home buyers have little choice of appliances when they buy
houses, and renters typically have little control over the heating and cooling systems used
in their apartments. NRC, ENERGY, supra note 156, at 117-20.
199 NRC, ENERGY, supra note 156, at 51-52.
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objections from the right and the left. The question is whether the law
can disrupt this gridlock. One way to do so is to link the personal
responsibility norm to carbon neutrality by using information that res-
onates with individuals across the political spectrum. Changes in
beliefs about threats to biodiversity may motivate those who already
hold the abstract environmental protection norm. Similarly, informa-
tion about the disparate impact of climate change on the poor may
motivate those who hold abstract norms about distributive justice.
But if many of those who hold the personal responsibility norm are
less motivated by environmental protection and distributive justice
norms, then policies may need to change beliefs about the economic
and human health harms that individual carbon emissions will
cause.20° These belief changes have the prospect of demonstrating to
individuals across the political spectrum that carbon-emitting behav-
iors conflict with the personal responsibility norm.
2. The Concrete Norm of Carbon Neutrality
a. The Rising Popularity of Carbon Neutrality
The norm of carbon neutrality involves a perceived obligation to
achieve zero net carbon emissions through a combination of reduc-
tions in carbon emissions and purchases of carbon offsets. The
carbon-neutrality norm reflects the idiosyncrasies of the carbon emis-
sions problem. Unlike many behaviors that contribute to environ-
mental harms, individuals can achieve carbon neutrality not just by
eliminating emissions but also by a combination of emissions reduc-
tions and offset purchases.2 1 Carbon neutrality has spread rapidly in
the last several years,202 although largely among those who were
already likely to adhere to environmental protection norms.203
Surveys on the adoption of the carbon-neutrality norm are not yet
available, but a variety of sources provide anecdotal indications that
200 At least one recent article in the popular press explicitly linked the purchasing of
offsets to a sense of personal responsibility and quoted one individual as saying, "I like the
idea that I pollute this much, so I pay this much." Christine Larson, A New Way to Ask,
"How Green is My Conscience?," N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2006, § 3, at 6. The growing aware-
ness of climate change in America is reflected in public-opinion polls, although climate
change continues to rank well below Iraq, the economy, and health care in terms of polit-
ical importance. John J. Fialka, Global Warming Pushes Politicians to Mark Positions,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2006, at B2.
201 See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
202 See, e.g., Matthew L. Wald, What's Kind to Nature Can Be Kind to Profits, N.Y.
TIMES, May 17, 2006, at G1 (discussing widespread corporate interest in carbon neutrality).
203 Anthony DePalma, Gas Guzzlers Find the Price of Forgiveness, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22,
2006, at Al (noting that beliefs about air emissions appear to be influencing personal
carbon-offset market).
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the norm is becoming widespread. "Carbon neutrality" was Oxford
Dictionary's "word of the year" for 2006.204 More than half a dozen
companies, ranging from the predictable (Ben & Jerry's) to the sur-
prising (Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation), have adopted carbon
neutrality as an overall corporate goal. 20 5 Many more firms have
adopted programs that rely on customers to pay more at the time of
purchase to help customers move in the direction of carbon neutrality
by offsetting the carbon footprint of particular goods or services.
20 6
Sports organizations, including the Australian Football League, FIFA
204 See supra note 13.
205 The companies that have declared a firm-wide carbon-neutrality goal include: (1)
Ben & Jerry's, DePalma, supra note 203; (2) HSBC, Braden Phillips, Paying the Freight for
Polluting the Air: Europe Takes the Lead, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2006, at F8; (3) News
Corporation, Louise Story, The Hidden Life of Paper and Its Impact on the Environment,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2006, at C3; (4) Marks and Spencer (a UK grocer and department
store), John Willman, M&S Chief Wins "Eco-Plan" Praise, FIN. TIMES (London), July 3,
2007, at 4; (5) Saab Australia, Press Release, Saab Austl., Saab Drivers Go Carbon Neutral
(Jan. 12, 2007), available at http://www.saab.com.au/main/AU/en/pressreleases/4/
index.shtml; (6) Salesforce.com, Gavin Clarke, Salesforce.com Goes Carbon Neutral, REG-
ISTER (London), Jan. 18, 2007, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2OO7/O1/18/salesforcecarbon_
trading; (7) Silverjet, Andrew C. Revkin, Carbon-Neutral Is Hip, but Is It Green?, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 29, 2007, § 4, at 1; and (8) Timberland, Jad Mouawad, A Few Companies Take
Special Steps to Curb Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2006, at C1. BP contributes to offset
registered customers' travel emissions in the United Kingdom when they purchase BP gas.
James Daley, BP Targets Green Consumers with Carbon-Offset Scheme for Drivers,
INDEPENDENT (London), Aug. 23, 2006, at 37, available at http://news.independent.co.uk/
business/news/article1221122.ece.
206 For example, for a 2% premium on its usual shipping charge, DHL offsets all emis-
sions from transport to make its delivery and logistics services carbon neutral. Morning
Edition: Europe's Carbon Trading Market Sees Brisk Business (NPR radio broadcast June
5, 2007), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=10716772
(follow "listen" hyperlink for audio recording). Similarly, Pacific Electric & Gas allows
customers to add a monthly charge to their electric bill that is used to purchase offsets for
the greenhouse gas emissions from their electricity use. See Rebecca Smith, California
Kindles Green Energy; Ahead of New Standards, Utilities Push Use of Cleaner Resources,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 2006, at A2; see also Press Release, Ford Motor Co., Ford and
TerraPass Create Program To Help Drivers Reduce Greenhouse Gas (Apr. 28, 2006),
available at http://media.ford.com/newsroom/feature-display.cfm?release=22971
(describing Ford's pilot program with TerraPass to allow customers to purchase offsets for
greenhouse gas emissions from driving); Damon Darlin, Dell Says Plant a Tree, Help the
Environment, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2007, at C6 (noting that Dell donates money from com-
puter sales to funds promoting offsets); Michelle Higgins, Raising the Ante on Eco-tourism,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2006, § 5, at 12 (describing trend of travel companies, including
Expedia and Travelocity, to purchase carbon offsets to allow travelers to compensate for
carbon dioxide production from trips); Tom Arnold, Testing TerraPass on the Shelf at
Sam's Club, TerraPass Blog, Jan. 22, 2007, http://www.terrapass.com/blog/posts/2007/01/
testing-terrapass-on-the-shelf-at-sams-club.html (noting Sam's Club's bundling of
TerraPass with pressure washer purchases in order to offset carbon dioxide emissions).
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(for the 2006 World Cup), and the National Football League have also
begun adopting carbon neutrality for particular events or seasons.
20 7
Not-for-profit organizations and governments also are adopting
carbon neutrality.20 8 California's most recent gubernatorial inaugura-
tion was carbon neutral.20 9 Several governments attempted to make a
recent international summit meeting carbon neutral, although the
effort faced political obstacles. 210 New Zealand,21' the Vatican,212 the
Canadian province of British Columbia, 13 and at least one British
town2 14 have announced their intention to become carbon neutral.
The presidents of more than 150 colleges and universities in the
United States have signed a statement committing to take steps
toward achieving carbon neutrality.
21 5
More than a dozen personal carbon calculators are now available
on the Internet.216 These calculators typically allow individuals to
input data on their motor vehicle and household energy use and esti-
mate their total annual carbon emissions. In addition, more than
thirty nongovernmental organizations and for-profit corporations now
207 Stephanie Peatling, A Worthy Goal: AFL to Ban Greenhouse Gases, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD, Sept. 19, 2006, at 3, available at http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/
afl-puts-its-energy-into-greener-goals/2006/09/18/158431644199.html (Australian Football
League); Wald, supra note 202 (National Football League and World Cup).
208 For example, the Natural Resources Defense Council has offset the emissions from
electricity use at its Washington, D.C., office. Antonio Regalado, New Lifestyle Option for
the Eco-Minded: Carbon-Neutral, WALL ST. J., May 14, 2004, at B1.
209 Press Release, Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., Pacific Gas and Electric Company Energizes
Governor's 2007 Inaugural "Green Dream" Celebration (Jan. 4, 2007), available at http://
sev.prnewswire.com/oil-energy/20070104/SFTH04404012007-1.html.
210 Matthew Chapman, Green Government Plan "a Fiasco," BBC.coM, Oct. 29, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6092460.stm (describing efforts to make 2006 G8
Summit carbon neutral).
211 Eduard Goldberg, New Zealand Prime Minister Announces Plans To Make Country
"Carbon Neutral," Int'l Env't Daily (BNA), Feb. 23, 2007.
212 Elisabeth Rosenthal, Vatican's Tree Penance: Forgive Us Our C0 2, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
17, 2007, at A4.
213 British Columbia To Trim Greenhouse Gases, Go Carbon Neutral, ENV'T NEWS SER-
VICE, Feb. 14, 2007, http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/feb2007/2007-02-14-02.asp.
214 Village Aims To Be Carbon Neutral, BBC.coM, Jan. 18, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/uk-news/england/merseyside/6275323.stm (reporting village of Ashton Hayes's inten-
tion to become carbon neutral).
215 American College & University Presidents Climate Commitment, http://
www.presidentsclimatecommitment.org/index.php (last visited Oct. 10, 2007).
216 See, e.g., Personal Emissions Calculator, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emis-
sions/indcalculator.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2007) (enabling users to "estimate [their]
household greenhouse gas emissions" and "identify ways to reduce [their] personal green-
house gases"). See generally J. Paul Padgett et al., A Comparison of Carbon Calculators,
27 ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. (forthcoming 2007) (comparing ten U.S.-based indi-
vidual carbon-emissions calculators).
Reprinted With The Permission of New York University School of Law
December 2007] 1719
HeinOnline  -- 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1719 2007
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
sell carbon offsets to support the burgeoning demand for them. 217
Although the number of individuals who have committed to carbon
neutrality is unknown, one firm that offers carbon offsets claims it has
more than 34,000 customers.218 Moreover, $110 million in voluntary
offsets were sold in 2006, an increase from $6 million in 2004.219
b. The Characteristics of Carbon Neutrality
Several features of carbon neutrality may explain its rapid adop-
tion. First, the concept is easy to understand and express. Studies
suggest that simplicity is essential for many types of socially induced
behavior changes because it enables individuals to notice, understand,
and remember information.220 The simplicity comes at a cost, how-
ever: It may be possible to achieve the short- and long-term global
emissions reduction targets through very large individual reductions
rather than actual neutrality. A norm phrased as "no harmful carbon
emissions" or "no more than your fair share" might accurately express
this concept. Alternatively, some might argue that individuals in
developed countries must become carbon negative to account for the
needs of the developing world. Communicating the precise permis-
sible levels of emissions to hundreds of millions of people in a way
that generates desired levels of behavior change, however, would be
impossible. Moreover, even if precise optimal emissions levels could
be calculated, they would change from year to year.
Carbon neutrality also squares well with the abstract personal-
responsibility norm: it enables individuals to be confident that regard-
less of others' behavior, they are not contributing to the harm. In
short, carbon neutrality enables individuals to take personal responsi-
bility for their contributions to climate change without reliance on
uncertain or shifting estimates of the necessary reductions or of
others' behavior.
Carbon neutrality may have achieved its current level of popu-
larity because compliance is achievable without significant sacrifice
for many individuals. Because carbon neutrality can be achieved
through a mix of emissions reductions and offsets, it does not require
massive behavior changes or financial costs. Many behavior changes
217 TERRAPASS, COMMENTS ON CENTER FOR RESOURCE SOLUTIONS GREEN-E GREEN-
HOUSE GAS PRODUCT STANDARD 1 (2007), available at http://www.terrapass.com/images/
blogposts/TerraPass%20CRS%20comments.pdf; CLEAN AIR-COOL PLANET, A CON-
SUMER'S GUIDE TO RETAIL CARBON OFFSET PROVIDERS iii (2006), available at http://
www.cleanair-coolplanet.org/ConsumersGuidetoCarbonOffsets.pdf.
218 TERRAPASS, supra note 217, at 7.
219 James Kanter, Guilt-Free Pollution. Or Is It?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2007, at C1.
220 NRC, DECISION MAKING, supra note 6, at 74.
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can generate substantial emissions reductions at low cost. Further-
more, although the retail price of carbon offsets is likely to rise, it
recently has been as low as $4 per ton of carbon.2 21 For example,
some individuals may not be able to reduce motor vehicle use, but at
least one retailer is selling offsets for the annual carbon emissions
from a standard car for roughly $50.222
Not surprisingly, psychological studies demonstrate that elimi-
nating the barriers and availability of excuses for inaction are critically
important steps for behavior change.223 Studies also demonstrate that
once individuals have committed to a particular viewpoint or action,
they tend to continue engaging in the behavior long after the original
period of commitment has ended.224 Compliance with the carbon-
neutrality norm does not require that individuals adopt other environ-
mental beliefs, norms, or lifestyles that are inconsistent with their
own. Moreover, it allows individuals to maintain control over the mix
of behavior changes that they will use to achieve compliance. These
points are essential. By adopting the carbon-neutrality norm, Ed
Begley's wife can reduce her carbon footprint without making fences
out of plastic milk jugs. More important, she can no longer assume
that those who are unwilling to take the milk-jug route do not have an
obligation to reduce their carbon footprint.
Empirical and theoretical studies support this analysis. Concrete
norms that require wholesale changes in worldviews or clusters of
abstract norms have little prospect for success. 225 Those who do not
subscribe to a worldview compatible with environmentalism will be
more likely to reject information about climate change if they are
forced to change their worldview rather than simply adopt new
norms.226 Similarly, individuals are likely to reject a new norm that
appears to divest them of control over daily life activities, as might be
221 See EcoBusinessLinks, supra note 2 (surveying prices among carbon-offset prov-
iders). Of course, carbon offsets are a viable means of reducing individuals' carbon foot-
print only if the offsets actually offset other emissions. For a discussion of the criticisms of
carbon offsets, see infra notes 229-40 and accompanying text.
222 See, e.g., TerraPass, TerraPass Products for Your Car, http://www.terrapass.com/
road/products.road.all.php (last visited Oct. 10, 2007) (selling carbon offsets for midsize
motor vehicle for $49.99). For a general discussion of carbon offsets, noting that "[c]arbon
offsets typically include renewable energy, energy efficiency and reforestation projects,"
see EcoBusinessLinks, supra note 2.
223 GARDNER & STERN, supra note 86, at 80, 92.
224 Id. at 86-87.
225 See, e.g., Rene6 Weber & Jennifer Crocker, Cognitive Processes in the Revision of
Stereotypic Beliefs, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 961, 967-68 (1983) (concluding
that removing stereotype by attempting in piecemeal fashion to disconfirm individual
beliefs associated with that stereotype is more effective than attempting to remove stereo-
types by altering entire belief system at once).
226 NRC, ENERGY, supra note 156, at 47.
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required if carbon neutrality could only be achieved through elimi-
nating all carbon emissions.2 27 In some cases, individuals not only
reject these types of behavior changes but also engage in reactance,
acting in opposition to the perceived directive.
2 28
c. Criticisms of Carbon Neutrality
Carbon neutrality is not without critics.229 One concern is that
offsets may not always provide genuine emissions reductions. For
example, offsets may purport to displace a carbon-emitting activity
that would not have occurred without the offset in the first place.
Alternatively, the offset-generating activity may have uncertain scien-
tific validity.230 In a worst-case scenario, offsets may be generated
from the destruction of greenhouse gases that were only produced in
the first place because of the market value of the offsets.231 A recent
study identified substantial variation in the quality of the offsets avail-
able on the retail market,232 and a private standard is under develop-
ment for retail carbon offsets. 233 Thus far, personal carbon calculators
have received less attention, but a forthcoming study concludes that
these calculators lack transparency and vary widely in methodology
and outputs.
234
A second concern is that even if offsets do reduce climate forcing
at the levels advertised, the availability of offsets may undermine
public support for government regulatory efforts and for individual
behavior change that reduces emissions instead of offsetting them.
235
227 Id.
228 See id. at 47-48 (contrasting "psychological reactance" seen with forced energy-
saving restrictions to relative lack of resistance seen when people are given "freedom and
control" over such restrictions).
229 See Ken Caldeira, Op-Ed., When Being Green Raises the Heat, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16,
2007, at A21 ("We cannot afford to indulge ourselves with well-intentioned activities that
do little to solve the underlying problem."); Stephanie Gruner, Future Forests Trades Trees
for Emissions-Critics Say Firm Oversimplifies Issue, Lets Polluters Off Hook, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 15, 2000, at B4B (noting that some environmentalists claim that "the science
behind carbon-forestry programs is faulty").
230 For example, a recent study raises questions about the benefits of planting trees
outside of tropical latitudes. Seran G. Gibbard et al., Climate Effects of Global Land
Cover Change, 32 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS L23705 (2005).
231 Keith Bradsher, Outsize Profits, and Questions, in Effort to Cut Warming Gases, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 21, 2006, at Al.
232 See CLEAN AIR-COOL PLANET, supra note 217, at iii (noting that carbon-offset prov-
iders vary in quality).
233 CTR. FOR RES. SOLUTIONS, DRAFT: GREEN-E GREENHOUSE GAS PRODUCT STAN-
DARD (2006), http://www.resource-solutions.org/mv/docs/DRAFTGreen-eGHG_
ProductStandard-for StakeholderComment.pdf.
234 Padgett et al., supra note 216.
235 The latter concern is sometimes expressed by analogizing offsets to the religious
indulgences offered in the Middle Ages. See Charles Krauthammer, Limousine Liberal
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These points are worthy of further empirical study, but it is equally
likely that individuals who commit to carbon neutrality through offset
purchases will become more supportive of government regulation and
more likely to reduce their own emissions. Studies demonstrate that
when individuals take affirmative steps to reduce their contributions
to social harms, they expect reciprocity from others-in this case,
industry, government, agriculture, and others. 236 In addition, as dis-
cussed above, when individuals make a personal or public commit-
ment to take an action, they are more likely to follow through on the
action.237 Offsets that involve public commitments by individuals to
reduce their carbon footprint thus may induce direct emissions reduc-
tions and may build public support for traditional regulatory
measures.
A third concern is that as carbon neutrality spreads and more
carbon offsets are purchased, the price of offsets is likely to rise. The
price increase has at least two implications. First, compliance with the
norm may decline if it requires higher costs to purchase offsets or
more onerous behavior changes to achieve increased emissions reduc-
tions. 238 Although an increase in offset prices is likely to occur, the
widespread adoption of carbon neutrality will create incentives for
private markets and government to provide alternatives for individ-
uals to achieve emissions reductions. In addition, individuals who
have adopted the carbon-neutrality norm may resist acting inconsis-
tently with the norm even after it becomes more expensive to
comply.23
9
A second implication of the price increase is that it raises distrib-
utive justice concerns. If carbon neutrality can be achieved by offsets,
Hypocrisy, TiME, Mar. 26, 2007, at 24, 24 (referring to offsets as "ecological indulgences");
Revkin, supra note 205 (noting that some environmentalists compare carbon offsets to
indulgences). This concern has a moral cast, suggesting that achieving carbon neutrality
through anything other than reductions in personal emissions is somehow fraudulent or
immoral. The analogy is false, however. Indulgences raised money but did not provide the
advertised benefit. Offsets can be genuine, and genuine offsets do provide the benefit
advertised. In addition, although in theory the availability of offsets could reduce the
moral stigma associated with carbon emissions, no widespread moral stigma currently is
associated with these emissions. Given the ubiquity of carbon emissions, the stigma may
not emerge unless some standard develops to identify the level at which emissions become
harmful. Widespread adoption of the carbon-neutrality norm may begin to establish the
standard at zero, even if the norm allows the standard to be achieved through emissions
reductions and offsets.
236 See Vandenbergh, supra note 6, at 1118-19 (describing reciprocity norm).
237 See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
238 See, e.g., Regalado, supra note 208 (noting that some "think the idea [of carbon
neutrality] will take off only when carbon costs are built into a product's price").
239 See, e.g., Vandenbergh, supra note 57, at 593-94 (discussing effects of cognitive dis-
sonance and habits on environmentally significant behaviors).
Reprinted With The Permission of New York University School of Law
December 20071
HeinOnline  -- 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1723 2007
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
and if offsets increase in price, the wealthy will be able to comply with
the norm without facing substantial lifestyle disruptions, but the poor
will not. Although this is a genuine concern, the remedy is not to
abandon carbon neutrality or carbon offsets but rather to provide
public or private subsidies to those who cannot afford offsets. We dis-
cuss one possible mechanism in Part V below.
240
C. Integration with Traditional Remedies
The rapid spread of carbon neutrality suggests that information
can activate norms and induce individuals to take low-cost actions to
reduce their carbon footprints. At the same time, norm activation is
not a panacea. Reducing many carbon-emitting behaviors could have
negative monetary payoffs for the individual, require changes in
deeply rooted habits, or face financial or infrastructure barriers. For
these behaviors, studies suggest that norm activation may have limited
effects.241 Instead, a mixture of information provision and traditional
regulatory measures may be needed. Traditional measures include
taxes or subsidies, cap-and-trade schemes, standards that regulate the
efficiency of consumer products made by industrial firms, and support
for new technologies and infrastructure. 242 Many of these approaches
seek to use price signals to change individuals' incentives, assuming
that individuals are rational actors with adequate information. Taxes
and subsidies do so directly, and cap-and-trade schemes do so indi-
rectly through increasing the costs of carbon emissions for electric
utilities and for the manufacturers of consumer goods. Yet, as the
National Research Council has concluded, incentive schemes alone
can fall short if appropriate information is not available.
243
240 For an analysis of possible approaches to creating "equity offset" programs that
address the distributive justice problem, see generally Michael P. Vandenbergh & Brooke
Ackerly, Climate Change and Individual Behavior. The Equity Problem, 26 VA. ENVTL.
L.J. (forthcoming 2007).
241 See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
242 Examples of technological innovations that may reduce carbon emissions include
advances in solar, hydrogen, nuclear, and carbon-sequestration technology. Experts sug-
gest that two of the most important technological developments, hydrogen vehicles and
carbon sequestration, may take many years to develop and deploy. See, e.g., Dawn
Reeves, DOE Admits C0 2 Sequestration Years Away in Coal-to-Fuel Plant Study, INSIDE
EPA, Jan. 19, 2007 (noting that Department of Energy environmental impact statement
concluded that carbon-sequestration technology is "years away"); Surge in Greenhouse
Gas Emissions Forecast as World Energy Demands Rise Through 2030, Daily Env't Rep.
(BNA) No. 119, at A-2 (June 21, 2006) (noting comments of EIA Administrator that he
does not see important role for hydrogen energy until after 2030).
243 NRC, DECISION MAKING, supra note 6, at 76-77 (noting that information can be
"instrumental" in changing carbon-emitting behaviors when combined with taxes and
other incentives and in some cases can increase effectiveness of incentives by factor of ten).
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The need to combine the type of information that is likely to acti-
vate norms with traditional measures is perhaps most obvious when
examining carbon taxes.244 Individuals often do not have sufficient
information to respond rationally to changes in price signals.245 They
tend to overemphasize the energy-reducing value of behaviors that
have perceptible effects, such as turning off lights, and to discount
behaviors that are less perceptible but have much greater effects on
energy savings, such as improving the efficiency of heating and cooling
systems.2 46 This problem is particularly acute with home electricity
use. One study analogized the information available to individuals
when they make home energy use decisions to a grocery store in
which no prices are listed on the products and the consumer receives a
bill with only a total amount from the cashier.2 47 Given this lack of
information about how individuals can cut energy use, prices have lim-
ited effects on household energy consumption. 248
Moreover, individuals often are not rational in how they process
information about carbon-emitting behaviors. 249 For example, indi-
viduals steeply discount long-term savings from energy efficiency,
inducing them not to buy vehicles and home heating and cooling sys-
244 For an examination of the role of carbon taxes in addressing climate change, see
generally Roy Boyd et al., Taxation as a Policy Instrument to Reduce C0 2 Emissions: A Net
Benefit Analysis, 29 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 1 (1995). Taxes may be an efficient way to
influence individual behavior and may have effects soon after being imposed. Taxes also
create incentives for corporations that further leverage the taxes' influence on individual
behavior. For example, taxes that provide incentives for individuals to purchase fuel-effi-
cient cars also provide incentives for manufacturers to market auto fuel efficiency. During
the 1979 energy crisis, automakers spent roughly $100 million on fuel-economy advertising.
NRC, ENERGY, supra note 156, at 82. In addition, the most important function of taxes
may be to create incentives for the development of new technologies. POSNER, supra note
1, at 258-59. For a discussion of the role of subsidies in encouraging carbon reductions, see
id. at 159-60, 259, and Green, supra note 6, at 424-40.
245 See NRC, ENERGY, supra note 156, at 41-42 (discussing problems with information
for energy users).
246 Id. at 36-39 (citing studies).
247 Id. at 36.
248 For example, a 1983 study concluded that a price differential between 2:1 and 8:1
accounted for only 2% of the variation in home electricity use, largely because consumers
lacked information about the variable prices. GARDNER & STERN, supra note 86, at 109
(noting that perception that reducing peak demand was moral obligation accounted for
11% of variation). Households that received an enhanced information package as com-
pared to the standard utility information package reduced their peak energy use by 16%
more than those that received the standard package. Id.
249 See Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 405, 443-44 (2005) (describing range of common biases and irrational
behaviors that affect environmentally significant consumer choices); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
The Psychology of Global Climate Change, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 299, 314-16 (discussing
several cognitive biases that affect willingness to support government action to address
climate change).
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tems that have high initial costs but low annual energy costs. 250
Framing information in ways that directly address such cognitive
biases may help overcome those biases and induce consumers to
purchase more efficient products.
Perhaps most important, information that activates norms may be
necessary for more traditional regulatory schemes to be politically
viable. Tax changes are a vivid example of an unpopular policy, but
many of the other traditional environmental measures also require
civic support for public spending (e.g., for technology or infrastructure
development) or require public support to overcome industry resis-
tance (e.g., to cap-and-trade schemes or efficiency requirements).
2 51
Taxes on energy, and gas taxes in particular, are remarkably unpop-
ular in the United States.
252
The greatest limitation, perhaps, on the prospects for tax mea-
sures and many other traditional measures is the assumption that indi-
viduals will support measures that are against their short-term
interests. The irony is that rational-actor theorists often advocate gov-
ernment policies that appeal to individuals' self-interest without
addressing how individuals will be induced to engage in civic behavior
(e.g., voting, joining advocacy groups, and contacting policymakers)
that in and of itself is not in the individuals' self-interest in the short
term. As discussed above, studies suggest that norm activation may
be even more successful at inducing civic behavior changes than it is at
inducing direct behavior changes. 25 3 In the absence of the widespread
250 Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 249, at 444.
251 See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965) (providing early formulation of public choice theory
and description of barriers to collective action toward common interest). Cap-and-trade
schemes for industrial pollutants may reduce emissions attributable to individual behavior
by reducing the emissions from the utilities from which individuals buy their electricity and
from the manufacturing plants that produce consumer goods. Manufacturers, however, are
not likely to encourage conservation measures when such measures conflict with their eco-
nomic interests, which often lie with increased product and energy use. See NRC,
ENERGY, supra note 156, at 42-43 (describing these mixed and conflicting incentives
among producers).
252 POSNER, supra note 1, at 118 ("[A] politician who wants to raise taxes today to mini-
mize the risk of catastrophes a thousand years hence will be cutting his throat."). Despite
widespread support for climate change measures in California, a 2006 ballot measure that
would tax oil production-yet not affect gasoline prices at the pump-failed by a vote of
55% to 45%. Aaron S. Edlin, If Voters Won't Go for Taxing Oil To Conserve Energy, How
Do We Do It?, ECONOMISTS' VOICE, Nov. 2006, http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol3/iss9/art2.
Boulder, Colorado, appears to be the only jurisdiction in the United States to have
adopted a carbon tax. Katie Kelley, City Approves "Carbon Tax" In Effort to Reduce Gas
Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2006, at A13.
253 See supra note 176 and accompanying text. Scholars unfortunately have given only
limited attention to how public support can be generated to put traditional regulatory mea-
sures in place. See Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 172, at 1684-92 (discussing societal bar-
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adoption of carbon neutrality or other norms that create a sense of
obligation to reduce individual carbon emissions, support for a carbon
tax or other traditional measures may not arise at all or may arise too
slowly for these measures to contribute meaningfully to the short-term
emissions reduction target.
Finally, widespread adoption and activation of norms such as
carbon neutrality may be required to prevent consumption patterns
from overwhelming the emissions reductions that can be achieved
from the promotion of new technologies, industry efficiency stan-
dards, and other similar measures. 254 The effects of changing con-
sumption patterns on carbon emissions can be seen in both the
household and transportation sectors. For example, a recent study
suggests that even though refrigerators are three to four times more
efficient than they were in the 1970s, the total demand for electricity
from refrigerators has not decreased.25 5 Rather than discarding less
efficient refrigerators, consumers often have just added additional
units. The number of households, the size of refrigerators, and the
number of households with more than one refrigerator all have
increased.256 The growth in home air conditioning shows a similar
pattern. Thirty years ago, only 36% of single-family homes were built
with central air conditioning, compared to 87% today.
257
Similarly, even though the overall efficiency requirements for
motor vehicles have been essentially flat for almost two decades, total
carbon emissions have increased dramatically because there are more
vehicles on the road, each vehicle is driven more, and customers are
purchasing many of the least fuel-efficient vehicles available.
258
Thirty years ago, 61% of automobiles were built with air conditioning,
but today that figure is 98%.259 In addition, driving patterns have
riers to more sensible climate policies, including irrational assessment of distant future
risks).
254 Government efficiency standards typically take the form of mandated efficiency stan-
dards for home appliances and efficiency standards or emissions standards for motor vehi-
cles. See John C. Dernbach, Overcoming the Behavioral Impetus for Greater U.S. Energy
Consumption, 20 PAC. McGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEV. L.J. 15, 19 (2007) (discussing
U.S. efforts to boost energy efficiency of appliances, buildings, and motor vehicles).
255 Jack N. Barkenbus, Putting Energy Efficiency in a Sustainability Context: The Cold
Facts About Refrigerators, 48 ENVIRONMENT 10, 13-16 (2006) (describing refrigerator effi-
ciency and demand trends and noting that overall electricity used by' refrigerators "has
remained comparable in absolute terms").
256 Id.
257 William Saletan, Planet of the Indoor People, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 2006, at B2.
258 Dernbach, supra note 254, at 24-26.
259 Saletan, supra note 257. The trends are not limited to the United States. A decade
ago, only 25% of new cars in France had air conditioning; today the figure is 75%.
Lawrence J. Speer, Vehicle Air Conditioning in France Worsening Climate Change,
Environment Agency Finds, Int'l Env't Daily (BNA), June 30, 2003.
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become less fuel efficient and more carbon-emitting. 260 Thus, unless
traditional measures like efficiency standards and taxes are coupled
with the kinds of changes in individual behavior that can arise from
norm activation, these traditional measures are likely to fall far short
of their potential.
V
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND INSTITUTIONAL ACTION
The norm of carbon neutrality has spread remarkably in recent
years, but anecdotal information suggests that it has yet to spread
beyond those who adhere to proenvironmental abstract norms. Given
the timing and magnitude of the short- and long-term emissions
reduction targets, the carbon-neutrality norm will need to spread not
only among those who ascribe to environmental norms but also to
those who do not. This Part examines how policymakers can use the
regulatory regime to push the emerging carbon-neutrality norm
toward a tipping point without propagandizing.261 As a general
matter, policymakers can do so by requiring that agencies collect and
disseminate accurate information about the consequences of indi-
vidual carbon emissions and the steps that individuals can take to miti-
gate those consequences. 262 Although many past informational
efforts have been ineffective, in prior times of crisis-such as the scrap
drives of World War I-government has engaged in successful efforts
to persuade individuals to act by providing information about the
effects of behavior.2 63 The costs and benefits of the measures pro-
posed in this Part will require careful analysis, but many of these mea-
sures have the potential to deliver emissions reductions more quickly
and at lower costs than many of the traditional measures.
260 See Fuel Economy Labeling of Motor Vehicles: Revisions to Improve Calculation of
Fuel Economy Estimates, 71 Fed. Reg. 5426, 5428-30 (proposed Feb. 1, 2006) (to be codi-
fied at 40 C.F.R. pts. 86 & 600) (proposing use of new emission tests to account for changes
in Americans' driving behavior).
261 Unfortunately, U.S. government agencies, unlike their Canadian counterparts, have
been reluctant to promote public policies like conservation through information cam-
paigns. NRC, ENERGY, supra note 156, at 74-80.
262 Studies demonstrate that mere hortatory calls to change environmentally significant
behavior that do not provide information on the consequences of that behavior are typi-
cally ineffective at changing environmental norms. Id. at 73 (citing Peter Ester & Richard
A. Winett, Toward More Effective Antecedent Strategies for Environmental Programs, 11 J.
ENVTL. SYSTEMS 201 (1982); Paul C. Stern & Gerald T. Gardner, Psychological Research
and Energy Policy, 36 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 329 (1981)).
263 See generally CARL A. ZIMRING, CASH FOR YOUR TRASH: SCRAP RECYCLING IN
AMERICA 81-101 (2005) (discussing scrap drives and scrap recycling industry during World
War II and other periods).
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A. Information Disclosure
Government reports inform the public about many of the poten-
tial consequences of climate change. The principal gaps in the avail-
able information are information that identifies individuals' emissions,
the resulting economic and human health harms, and the steps they
can take to reduce their emissions.264 On these issues, the public
sector in the United States has been largely silent. In its place, a
cacophony of messages from public interest groups, corporations,
industry trade associations, and others barrages the public on a daily
basis. Although the rapid spread of the carbon-neutrality norm sug-
gests that some information is having an effect, the information is
often of the type that appeals only to those with strong environmental
norms, addresses only a limited set of behaviors, and sends conflicting
messages. In addition, studies suggest that information is more likely
to influence behavior if it is provided by a credible source,265 and that
individuals typically view government entities as more credible than
private entities.2
66
The discussion below identifies approaches to information disclo-
sure targeted at norm activation for climate change. Although no
single approach is likely to lead to universal changes in carbon-emit-
ting behaviors, in combination these approaches may lead to wide-
spread adoption of the carbon-neutrality norm and to behavior
change.
1. The Individual Carbon-Release Inventory
One of the most important roles that government can play is to
provide individuals and policymakers with accurate information about
the aggregate emissions attributable to individual behavior and the
emissions of the average individual. The Toxics Release Inventory
(TRI), a remarkably successful program focused on toxic emissions,267
may provide a template for annual government disclosure of indi-
264 Attempts to use more direct regulatory approaches aimed at individual consumption,
such as the creation of personal carbon accounts, have been suggested in the United
Kingdom. See Rob Edwards, The New Idea for Tackling Climate Change: Carbon Cards,
SUNDAY HERALD (Glasgow), Jan. 1, 2006, at 16 (describing proposal to create carbon
accounts for all adults that would ration "carbon units" corresponding to energy usage).
265 See, e.g., NRC, ENERGY, supra note 156, at 96-98 (describing importance of credi-
bility to information campaigns and proposing strategies for bolstering campaign
credibility).
266 GARDNER & STERN, supra note 86, at 114, 115 fig.5-3 (citing study finding much
higher consumer response to marketing strategies showing higher degrees of government
support).
267 See generally Vandenbergh, supra note 6, at 1139-46 (describing Toxics Release
Inventory).
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vidual and household carbon emissions. Created by the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986,268 the TRI pro-
visions do not mandate reductions in toxic chemical releases. Instead,
they require large industrial firms to quantify and report their toxic
chemical releases on an annual basis.269 The EPA then compiles the
data into a publicly available database and issues an annual report on
changes in emissions by year, by chemical, and by region.270 The
industrial TRI data release often triggers substantial media atten-
tion.271 The TRI data release also has facilitated NGO, government,
corporate, and academic reports on industrial toxic emissions.2 72
Despite the absence of mandatory reductions, empirical studies have
concluded that TRI reporting requirements have induced firms to
reduce their toxic chemical releases.2 73
Policymakers could apply a similar approach to emissions from
individuals and households through an Individual Carbon Release
Inventory (ICRI).27 4 The ICRI could be managed by the EPA or by
the EIA.275 To fill gaps in the data, rather than having hundreds of
millions of individuals complete forms to report on their carbon emis-
sions, the EIA could conduct national surveys. The EIA could dis-
close the ICRI data at the same time and in the same format as the
release of the industrial TRI toxic chemical emissions data. Disclo-
sure in this way would enable news about individual carbon emissions
to be discussed alongside news accounts about corporate toxic
releases. In addition, year-over-year trends and comparisons among
268 Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1728 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050
(2000)).
269 42 U.S.C. § 11023(a).
270 Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 § 313(j), 42 U.S.C.
§ 11023(j) (requiring EPA to "establish and maintain in a computer data base a national
toxic chemical inventory" and to "make these data accessible by computer telecommunica-
tion and other means").
271 See Vandenbergh, supra note 6, at 1142 & nn.177-80 (describing media coverage).
272 Id. at 1142-43.
273 Id. at 1144-45 & n.195 (citing James T. Hamilton, Is the Toxics Release Inventory
News to Investors?, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 292 (2001); James T. Hamilton, Pollution
as News: Media and Stock Market Reactions to the Toxics Release Inventory Data, 28 J.
ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 98 (1995); Shameek Konar & Mark A. Cohen, Does the Market
Value Environmental Performance?, 83 REV. ECON. & STAT. 281, 289 (2001); Shameek
Konar & Mark A. Cohen, Information as Regulation: The Effect of Community Right to
Know Laws on Toxic Emissions, 32 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 109 (1997)).
274 The ICRI is modeled on, and could easily be incorporated into, the proposed
Individual Toxics Release Inventory. Id. at 1149; see also Dernbach, supra note 254, at 36
& n.131 (discussing carbon footprint modeled on proposed Individual Toxics Release
Inventory).
275 We assume for the purposes of this discussion that Congress would delegate respon-
sibility to the EIA, which already collects and publishes much of the data necessary to
assemble an ICRI.
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regions and states would make the annual release of the information
more newsworthy. The disclosure also would prompt government,
NGO, and academic reports analyzing the data and providing addi-
tional information.
By disclosing aggregate carbon release data, the ICRI also would
demonstrate the importance of individuals as a sector or group.
276
The news accounts about the ICRI also could activate the carbon-neu-
trality norm by changing beliefs about the harms caused by individual
carbon emissions and the means available to ameliorate those conse-
quences. Drawing on our earlier example, a quantification of the
mean and aggregate emissions associated with personal motor vehicle
idling could be included in the annual ICRI report, and media reports
about these emissions might update individuals' outdated beliefs
about the personal and social costs of idling.
277
2. Information on Specific Behaviors
In addition to information about carbon emissions, individuals
require information about the types of behavior changes that will gen-
erate emissions reductions, both to activate norms and to provide
knowledge of what steps to take once the individual feels an obliga-
tion to act. The ICRI may not generate specific information about
emissions reduction efforts, but the media accounts that accompany
the release of its data and follow-up reports by NGOs and others may
do so. The potential effect of a simple updating of beliefs is substan-
tial. Numerous studies indicate that individuals are unaware of the
amount of energy they use and the amount of carbon emissions they
produce through their individual behaviors, an "energy invisibility"
that is most acute for household energy use.
278
To address this information deficit, public information campaigns
will need to reflect a sophisticated understanding of how information
is received, processed, and used by individuals. For example, the
National Research Council has suggested that information is more
likely to generate behavior change if it is understandable, attracts
attention, stays in the memory, is provided at times and places that are
close to the point of decisionmaking, and is provided by a trustworthy
source. 279 A variety of national, state, and local public information
campaigns and labeling programs may be necessary. Programs and
technologies currently in development through private sector initia-
276 See supra Part II.A.
277 See supra notes 110-21 and accompanying text.
278 See supra notes 245-48 and accompanying text.
279 NRC, DECISION MAKING, supra note 6, at 74-75.
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tives include labels indicating the carbon footprint of foods, a device
that records and displays household electricity usage on an ongoing
basis, and a simple, color-coded carbon label for consumer prod-
ucts. 280 Another possibility is a digital readout for cars and trucks that
displays carbon emissions on an ongoing basis.281
More resource-intensive local information campaigns also may be
necessary. These programs may need to combine nationwide research
with state and local implementation. Ensuring that these efforts rely
on the best available social-science research and are implemented rig-
orously will require a fundamental reexamination of the way govern-
ment funds research, staffs information offices, designs and evaluates
programs, and interacts with state and local governments.282 Personal
motor vehicle idling is the type of activity that may be particularly
amenable to change through a sophisticated national, state, and local
effort. The effort not only could update individuals' beliefs about the
extent to which shorter idling times are often in their personal eco-
nomic interest, but it also could provide the information necessary to
activate norms that influence idling times.
3. Information on Economic and Human Health Harms
As discussed above, the personal responsibility norm may be
more widely held than the environmental protection norm. 283 Individ-
uals are more likely to be motivated by information that indicates that
their behavior will cause economic or physical harm to other people
than by information about harms caused to the environment. 284 As a
result, government efforts that disclose estimates of the potential
human health and economic harms of climate change may activate
carbon-neutrality norms among those who feel strongly about per-
280 See Katherine N. Probst, Combating Global Warming One Car at a Time: C0 2 Emis-
sions Labels for New Motor Vehicles, RESOURCES, Spring 2006, at 9, 9-11 (proposing color-
coded CO2 emissions labels for all new cars and discussing similar initiatives outside
United States); Elizabeth Rigby, Tesco to "Carbon Label" Its Products, FIN. TIMES
(London), Jan. 19, 2007, at 1 (noting that UK grocery chain Tesco is providing carbon
labels for all products indicating amount of CO2 emitted during production, delivery, and
consumption); see also Ian Herbert, Carbon Footprint of Products To Be Displayed on
Label, INDEPENDENT (London), Mar. 16, 2007, at 22, available at http://www.independent.
co.uk/environment/climate-change/article2362754.ece (describing initiative to provide
labels detailing "carbon footprint" of products).
281 Although policymakers have taken limited steps to use public information campaigns
to reduce personal motor vehicle idling, a sophisticated, far-reaching effort has not been
conducted in the United States. For policy proposals to reduce idling, see MMA, BAR-
RIERS, supra note 111, at 54-58.
282 See infra Part V.D.
283 See supra Part IV.B.1.
284 See, e.g., Vandenbergh, supra note 131, at 88-99 (noting that human health and envi-
ronmental norms may have distinct effects on behavior).
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sonal responsibility but do not ascribe to the environmental protection
norm.
Much remains to be done to compile both human health and eco-
nomic information. As to human health harms, the Centers for
Disease Control is just beginning a comprehensive program to identify
the health effects of climate change.285 As to economic harms, regula-
tory-impact assessments for recent regulations generally have
excluded consideration of climate change. For example, although the
corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards for personal
motor vehicles are among the most important carbon-reducing mea-
sures for the transportation sector, the regulatory impact assessment
for the 2006 CAFE amendments excludes consideration of the costs
and benefits arising from potential climate-change impacts.
286
According to the assessment:
The agency continues to view the value of reducing emissions of
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases as too uncertain to sup-
port their explicit valuation and inclusion among the savings in envi-
ronmental externalities from reducing gasoline production and
use.... As a consequence, the agency has elected to include no
economic value for reducing greenhouse gas emissions .. among
the benefits of reducing gasoline use via more stringent fuel
economy regulation.
287
Putting aside whether rational risk regulation by policymakers
can occur if one of the most important long-term reasons for adopting
a standard is excluded from the regulatory impact analysis, if govern-
ment is to influence the behavior of those who adhere to the personal
responsibility norm but not the environmental protection norm, it will
need to express quantitative ranges for the dollar value of the eco-
nomic and human health harms of climate change.288 Academics and
policymakers have demonstrated that cost-benefit analyses can be
conducted by including broad ranges of potential costs and benefits,
even if the precise costs and benefits are hard to calculate.
289
285 Kim Krisberg, Climate Change Predicted To Have Dire Effects on Health, NATION'S
HEALTH (Wash., D.C.), Apr. 2007, at 1.
286 OFFICE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS & EVALUATION, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., FINAL
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: CORPORATE AVERAGE FUEL ECONOMY AND CAFE




288 See V. Kerry Smith et al., Can Public Information Programs Affect Risk Percep-
tions?, 9 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 41, 57 (1990) (suggesting that quantitative assess-
ments more effectively promote accurate assessments of risk from radon exposure).
289 See, e.g., Jon Gjerde et al., Optimal Climate Policy Under the Possibility of a Catas-
trophe, 21 RESOURCE & ENERGY ECON. 289 (1999) (providing overview of probabilities
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The regulatory impact analyses that accompany rulemakings are
not widely accessible to the public, but they provide information that
others use to disseminate information to the public. In addition, they
demonstrate the extent to which agencies have been unwilling to
quantify and disclose the effects of climate change, even if only in
ranges. Rational risk regulation requires a more thoughtful approach
than excluding the most pressing environmental issue of our time
because of imprecise information.290 Although the application of a
cost-benefit analysis technique to climate-change regulations faces a
number of obstacles, one possible solution is to amend the existing
executive order on White House regulatory review of agency rulemak-
ings291 to require all relevant cost-benefit analyses to account for cli-
mate change-perhaps by using high, medium, and low assumptions
regarding the costs and benefits of avoiding climate change. Doing so
not only will contribute to more rational prioritization of regulatory
resources but also may facilitate the linkage between personal respon-
sibility and carbon neutrality among those who do not identify with
environmentalism.
4. The Carbon-Neutral Registry
One of the fundamental challenges of the climate-change
problem is that it poses a classic temporal trap: The costs of emissions
reductions will have to be borne now, but they will principally benefit
those who will be living fifty or more years from now. 292 The thought
that future generations might revere those who act today might pro-
vide some solace to those bearing current costs. Yet there is little or
no way for individuals today to take comfort from the notion that
future generations might know that they achieved carbon neutrality
and thus did not contribute to the problem.
We venerate those who are thought to have done great things in
the past, including both the leaders and the group members. We also
give higher esteem to their offspring, sometimes for many generations.
One way to address the temporal trap regarding the costs and benefits
of climate change is for government to establish a national Carbon-
and costs associated with catastrophic climate change and proposing model for deter-
mining probabilities of catastrophe).
290 See Kenneth J. Arrow, Global Climate Change: A Challenge to Policy, ECONOMISTS'
VOICE, June 2007, http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol4/iss3/art2 ("[Bloth futurity and uncer-
tainty require significant discounting. However, even with that .... we are much better off
to act to reduce CO2 emissions substantially than to suffer and risk the consequences of
failing to meet this challenge.").
291 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000).
292 See Rachlinski, supra note 249, at 299-303 (discussing "social traps" that can dis-
courage collective action).
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Neutral Registry. The Registry would list in a permanent, public
monument the names of those who have pledged to be carbon neu-
tral.293 Although several aspects of the Registry, such as policing
compliance with pledges of carbon neutrality, would pose substantial
administrative challenges, research on the influence of public commit-
ments suggests that minimal standards and enforcement may be ade-
quate to generate substantial behavior change.
294
B. Direct Carbon-Neutral Subsidies
One possibility for addressing the distributive justice issues raised
above 295 is to provide public or private subsidies to overcome the lack
of financial resources for some individuals. Although public subsidies
may be necessary in the long run, they are difficult to fund at mean-
ingful levels and are subject to waste and abuse. An appealing private
alternative is to build upon the concept advanced by nonprofit firms
such as GlobalGiving, 296 which enables individuals to use the Internet
to make financial contributions directly to specific projects. This
approach can reduce overhead to less than 10% and provide donors
with a substantial amount of control over the use of their funds.
297
A similar effort could leverage the carbon-neutrality norm by
enabling individuals to purchase offsets from a program that directs
funds to individuals who are at or near the poverty line. In addition to
the benefits of compliance with the carbon-neutrality norm, those who
purchase these offsets would gain the normative benefits of helping
low-income individuals. Local community groups could serve as
intermediaries, as could firms such as retailers of automobiles, appli-
ances, and other equipment. 298
293 Efforts that rely on charitable contributions often provide measures of public recog-
nition. An example is the tree-planting movement in Israel, which offers certificates for
those who sponsor the planting of trees in the desert. Trees for the Holy Land, http://
www.treesfortheholyland.com/index.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2007). Many of these chari-
table programs, however, do not confront the temporal trap presented by climate change
because the donors and donees are currently living.
294 See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
295 See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
296 GlobalGiving, http://www.globalgiving.com (last visited Aug. 31, 2007).
297 GlobalGiving, How It Works, http://www.globalgiving.com/howitworks.html (last
visited Aug. 31, 2007).
298 For a discussion of an "equity offset" scheme along these lines proposing a carbon
offset market feature that would enable donors to subsidize the purchase of efficient goods
by individuals at or near the poverty line, see generally Vandenbergh & Ackerly, supra
note 240.
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C. Standard Development and Enforcement
Retail carbon offsets and personal carbon calculators are two
indispensable tools associated with carbon neutrality, but they require
legitimacy among customers and the public in order to function. A
recent technical assessment identified several shortcomings that raise
concerns about the efficacy of carbon offsets. 299 Similarly, a forth-
coming analysis of personal carbon calculators concludes that their
methodologies lack transparency and that they vary widely in conver-
sion factors and outputs. 300 In addition, many carbon-calculator prov-
iders are associated with retail carbon-offset providers who have
incentives to promote higher offset sales.
30 1
Given the lack of consumer knowledge, lack of transparency
among products, and incentives of providers, standards for retail
carbon offsets and carbon calculators are essential to ensure their effi-
cacy and legitimacy. Enforcement of these standards may be equally
important. Federal regulatory agencies have shown little interest in
setting or enforcing standards, and it is unclear if they have the statu-
tory authority to do so. Nevertheless, government could facilitate the
development and enforcement of private standards. 30 2 Private stan-
dard-setting programs with private certifiers have proliferated in the
forestry, fishing, and other industry sectors. 30 3 These standards
appear to be influencing firm behavior, although the adequacy of the
standards and the extent of their enforcement remain unclear.
30 4
Private standard setting for retail carbon offsets is already under
way,305 and a similar effort may be necessary for carbon calculators.
In addition, a variety of private certifiers have emerged to begin to fill
299 See CLEAN AIR-COOL PLANET, supra note 217, at 21-23 (dividing offset providers
into top-tier and non-top-tier based on quality of emissions reductions, and calling for
more transparency from all providers). Concerns about carbon offsets have stimulated a
congressional request for an inquiry by the Federal Trade Commission. Patricia Ware,
Markey Lauds Trade Commission's Decision to Review Effectiveness of Carbon Offsets,
Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 156, at A-1 (Aug. 14, 2007).
300 See Padgett et al., supra note 216 (manuscript at 4-5, on file with the New York
University Law Review) (noting that differences in carbon-calculator outputs may influ-
ence amount of effort individuals devote to reducing carbon emissions and types of steps
they take).
301 TerraPass is an example of a for-profit firm that offers a carbon calculator and sells
offsets. TerraPass, http://www.terrapass.com (last visited Aug. 31, 2007).
302 See Ware, supra note 299 (reporting that FTC will consider self-regulatory efforts of
carbon-offset market as part of its review of environmental marketing claims).
303 Errol Meidinger, The Administrative Law of Global Private-Public Regulation: The
Case of Forestry, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 47, 48-49 (2006).
304 Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private Contracting
in Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. REV. 913, 955-56 (2007).
305 See CTR. FOR RES. SOLUTIONS, supra note 233, at 2 (proposing private "Green-e
standard for Greenhouse Gas Products").
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the enforcement niche.30 6 At a minimum, policymakers should facili-
tate the development of private standard-setting and private moni-
toring while assessing whether they will be sufficient to ensure the
efficacy and legitimacy of retail carbon offsets and carbon calculators.
D. Agency Management and Oversight
Efforts to address individual and household carbon emissions
also will require fundamental changes in the structure, staffing, and
oversight of programs by government agencies. At a structural level,
the effort to collect and disseminate information to activate norms
may require the sustained attention and staffing that only a program
dedicated to this mission can provide. For example, studies identi-
fying the importance of trust in the source of the information, the
importance of accounting for the socioeconomic status of the neigh-
borhood, and the social influence of block captains on recycling pro-
grams suggest that carefully tailored, personnel-intensive programs
will be more successful than many other types of information-dissemi-
nation programs. 30 7 At the same time, these face-to-face programs
are expensive and difficult to organize and oversee.
Even if new programs are not initiated, staffing will require atten-
tion. Agency staffing reflects path dependency. For decades, legisla-
tive directives have required agencies such as the Department of
Energy (DOE) and the EPA to focus principally on large industrial
sources as the targets of their regulation. 308 Not surprisingly, their
staffing reflects this industry focus. For example, the DOE is an out-
growth of the Atomic Energy Commission and thus is staffed largely
with the engineers, scientists, and lawyers necessary to regulate large
power-generating sources. 30 9 In the early 1980s, only seventeen of the
19,972 employees at the DOE claimed advanced training in political
science, psychology, sociology, anthropology, or geography. 310
306 See, e.g., CLEAN AIR-COOL PLANET, supra note 217, at 15-20 (private group ranking
top carbon-offset providers).
307 See supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text. The Agricultural Extension Service
of the U.S. Department of Agriculture may be well positioned to play this role in some
communities. One institution worth further consideration is the Department of Energy's
Residential Conservation Service (RCS). During the last energy crisis, the RCS played a
leading role in information campaigns to reduce individual and household energy use, but
the service was largely dismantled early in the Reagan Administration. See NRC,
ENERGY, supra note 156, at 53 n.4 (describing general pressure to deregulate in 1981 and
its effects on RCS).
308 E.g., Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 § 302, 42
U.S.C. § 11002(b) (2000) (limiting statute's requirements to facilities with substances above
established thresholds).
309 NRC, ENERGY, supra note 156, at 12 n.4 (citing data from March 1981).
310 Id.
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Although the requirements of generating cost-benefit analyses have
induced the DOE, EPA, and other agencies to hire economists over
the last several decades, the agencies have had little incentive to hire
other social scientists who are trained to design, implement, and eval-
uate programs that use information to change individual behavior.
In addition to adding expertise from the social sciences to regula-
tory staffs, regulators will need to become less reluctant to use princi-
ples of effective communication. 311 At the outset, it is important to
note that experts are not immune to deficiencies in rational decision-
making arising from inadequate information and cognitive biases.
312
These deficiencies may have affected both the implementation of
information-transmission systems by policymakers and the research
supporting these systems by scholars.
Recent work by Robert Cialdini and colleagues demonstrates the
depth of resistance by government managers to recommendations
from social scientists. 31 3 Through a series of studies, Cialdini found
that the National Park Service could reduce the theft of petrified
wood from national parks through a campaign that emphasized both a
descriptive norm (that the vast majority of park visitors do not steal
fossils) and an injunctive norm (that stealing fossils is wrong).
314
Despite robust, statistically significant results from blind studies, park
managers still choose to make decisions based on informal data gath-
ering and their (incorrect) intuitive judgments about visitors'
responses to messages.
315
Perhaps not surprisingly, this type of decisionmaking by regula-
tory experts regarding individual behavior tracks how nonexperts
make decisions. Intuitions about human behavior are often incorrect,
and anecdotal information, gathered firsthand from individuals that
the decisionmaker knows, may exert strong influences on decision-
making. 316 The successful use of information by regulatory agencies
will require a more sophisticated approach.
311 See id. at 74-75 ("[G]overnment officials have generally been unwilling to build
energy information programs on principles of effective communication.").
312 See Paul Slovic et al., Rating the Risks, 21 ENVIRONMENT 14, 17, 38-39 (1979) (dis-
cussing how experts' biases cause them to underestimate risks and develop inadequate
safeguards).
313 See Robert B. Cialdini, Basic Social Influence Is Underestimated, 16 PSYCHOL.
INQUIRY 158, 159 (2005) (describing how leaders consistently underestimate persuasive
power of others' behavior despite social science research on issue); Robert B. Cialdini et
al., Managing Social Norms for Persuasive Impact, 1 Soc. INFLUENCE 3, 5 (2006) (detailing
government information campaigns ignoring current understandings of social influence).
314 Cialdini et al., supra note 313, at 10-11.
315 Id. at 12.
316 NRC, ENERGY, supra note 156, at 68 (relating example of weighing friend's experi-
ence with car over respected consumer magazine's opinion of car).
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Finally, policymakers will need to improve the oversight of gov-
ernment public information programs.317 This need extends to both
the performance of the information dissemination efforts themselves
(e.g., to what extent did carbon-emissions reductions arise from indi-
vidual behavior change?) and the management of the programs by
federal agencies, state and local governments, and contractors who are
likely to carry out many aspects of the information programs (e.g., was
money spent wisely?). Without careful design and monitoring, there
is a risk that information campaigns will be costly and ineffective. 318
A major emphasis on public information campaigns without such con-
trols may devolve into a wasteful subsidy for state and local govern-
ments and social-marketing firms that will only reinforce the
skepticism of scholars and policymakers.
CONCLUSION
The model results presented in this paper demonstrate the sub-
stantial contributions of individuals and households to carbon dioxide
emissions, but much remains to be understood about the contributions
from individuals as well as the social, economic, and legal influences
on individual carbon-emitting behaviors. Regulatory measures
designed to change the behavior of electric utilities or consumer-prod-
ucts manufacturers can assume a high degree of rationality in deci-
sionmaking. In contrast, individuals often lack adequate information,
suffer from cognitive biases, are subject to social influences, and act in
ways that are not easily understood through the lens of a rational-
actor model.
A broad mix of social, economic, scientific, and legal perspectives
and remedies will be required to address individuals' contribution to
climate change. The growing popularity of carbon neutrality demon-
strates the potential influence of norms on individual carbon-emitting
behaviors. Private parties are responsible for much of the carbon-
neutrality effort to date, but government may be able to push carbon
neutrality past a tipping point by collecting and disseminating the
information necessary to link carbon neutrality to the widely held
abstract norm of personal responsibility. This Article has identified a
number of concrete steps available to policymakers.
317 See id. at 74-80 (describing current ineffectiveness of government information
programs).
318 Knowing that waste or poor management could eviscerate support for public works
programs, President Franklin D. Roosevelt put strong controls in place for the New Deal
agencies. See Angel Manuel Moreno, Presidential Coordination of the Independent Regu-
latory Process, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 461, 484-86 (1994) (describing Roosevelt's aggressive
stance towards independent agencies).
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Efforts to change individual behavior through norm activation
will require the public sector to play a role that it has rarely played on
environmental issues in the past, and theoretical and empirical ques-
tions remain. Academics can contribute to this effort through
research that engages environmental engineers, atmospheric scien-
tists, social and behavioral scientists, and law and policy scholars,
among others, in an effort to identify the behaviors that contribute
most to carbon emissions, the social and economic influences on those
behaviors, and the legal and policy responses necessary to ensure that
behavior change measures are cost-effective and minimally
intrusive. 31
9
Individual behavior change is seen by some as "silly"-not the
stuff of rigorous, rational regulatory policy.320 Perhaps the most diffi-
cult change for policymakers and scholars will be to treat the indi-
vidual sector with the same level of sophistication and rigor as the
industrial sector and other sectors. The limited success of energy-effi-
ciency campaigns during the energy crisis of the 1970s, and the failure
of campaigns that encouraged mass transit and carpooling over the
last several decades, have led to deep skepticism about behavior
change. Yet the magnitude and timing of the emissions reductions
required to reduce the risk of catastrophic climate change, combined
with the large potential reductions that could be achieved from indi-
viduals, suggest that individual behavior should not-and perhaps
cannot-be left on the sidelines during the development of a compre-
hensive climate-change regulatory regime.
319 See NRC, DECISION MAKING, supra note 6, at 69 (advocating federal agency support
for "concerted research effort" on environmentally significant individual behavior).
320 Paine, supra note 126.
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APPENDIX
The model estimates the contribution of individual behavior to
U.S. carbon dioxide emissions in 2000.321 Individual behavior includes
only those behaviors that are under the direct, substantial control of
the individual and that are not undertaken in the scope of the indi-
vidual's employment. The model divides individual behavior into two
categories: household behaviors and transportation behaviors.
A. Households
The household behaviors present a challenge because most resi-
dential energy-consumption data are presented as household num-
bers. To account for this discrepancy, we convert data given per
household into data per individual, using the average American
household size as reported by the United States Census Bureau.322
To test the reliability of the model, we estimate household emis-
sions by using top-down and bottom-up approaches. For the top-
down approach, we calculate household energy consumption using
EIA data for residential fuel consumption. The EIA defines the resi-
dential sector as "[a]n energy-consuming sector that consists of living
quarters for private households. '323 A "household" is "[a] family, an
individual, or a group of up to nine unrelated persons occupying the
same housing unit. ' ' 324 To create a profile of individual greenhouse
gas emissions, we convert household energy use into individual energy
use. The 2000 U.S. Census reports that the U.S. population was
281,421,906, with an average household size of 2.59 persons per house-
hold.325 We divide the population by the average household size and
calculate the number of households in the United States to be
108,657,106.
Following the EIA's practice, we separate household energy use
into two categories: primary use and electricity use. Primary use
includes household energy consumption apart from an external
321 To ensure consistency, the data used in the model are from 2000 unless otherwise
stated.
322 U.S. Census Bureau, American FactFinder, Occupied Housing Characteristics: 2000,
http://factfinder.census.gov (click "Data Sets" on left side of page; then click "Geographic
Comparison Tables"; then select geography type of "Nation" and table format of "United
States - States; and Puerto Rico"; then click "Show Result") (last visited Aug. 18, 2007).
We divide each data set given "per household" by 2.59 persons per household.
323 EIA, 2004 REVIEW, supra note 62, at 392 (emphasis removed).
324 Id. at 385.
325 U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 322.
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power-generation source.326 Examples of primary energy users are
water heaters and stoves that utilize coal, natural gas, petroleum, or
wood, as opposed to electricity from a power plant. 327 By contrast,
the electricity category includes all household energy generated at a
power plant, regardless of fuel usage.
328
For primary use, the EIA's Annual Energy Review provides the
number of British thermal units (Btus) used annually in the residential
sector for coal, natural gas, petroleum, and wood. 329 We convert these
values into pounds of carbon dioxide by multiplying by the respective
conversion factors (pounds of carbon dioxide per million Btu).
330
Where the EIA further subdivides each primary energy source, giving
multiple conversion factors for each, we calculate an average of all the
conversion factors for each broad energy source (coal, natural gas,
petroleum, and wood). Finally, we divide these values by the number
of households and the population size to determine the amount of
carbon dioxide emitted per household and per person.
331
To divide power plant electricity into its corresponding fuels, we
calculate the percentage of fuel consumption used by referring to the
electricity flow diagram in the Annual Energy Review. 332 Using the
Annual Energy Review, we obtain the total residential electricity use
for 2000333 and multiply it by the percentages of fuel consumption to
ascertain the number of Btus attributable to each fuel source. We do
not account for inefficiency in electricity generation and line loss. We
multiply the thermal energy values by the same conversion factors
used in the primary consumption calculations, 334 and then we reduce
the figures into pounds per household and pounds per individual.
326 Email from Robert Adler, Energy Info. Admin., Dep't. of Energy, to Paul Padgett,
Graduate Student, Vanderbilt Univ. (June 23, 2006) (on file with the New York University
Law Review).
327 See id. ("Electricity is itself the result of using other fuels to generate it.").
328 See EIA, 2004 REVIEW, supra note 62, at 382 (defining "electricity retail sales").
329 Id. at 39 tbl.2.1b.
330 See EIA, LONG FORM, supra note 73, at 47-48 (listing conversion factors for energy
sources). For example, 5126 trillion Btu of natural gas x 128.129 lbs. CO2 per million Btu =
657 billion lbs. produced from the primary consumption of natural gas. The 128.129 coeffi-
cient for natural gas was determined by averaging the coefficients of the two natural gases
(pipeline natural gas and propane) that are used by households.
331 For example, 657 billion lbs. CO produced from primary natural gas consumption
108,657,106 households - 2.59 persons per household = 2330 lbs. CO2 per person from
primary natural gas consumption.
332 See EIA, 2004 REVIEW, supra note 62, at 223 (showing 2004 fuel consumption at
power plants). We assume that the distribution of fuel use did not change from 2000 to
2004, and we use these figures to calculate the relative 2000 fuel use at power plants.
333 id. at 39.
334 See EIA, LONG FORM, supra note 73, at 47-48 (listing conversion factors).
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We also calculate percentages using dollars spent per fuel source
for various household energy uses, such as space heating and lighting,
to examine the relative correlation of fuel type and use. 335 We calcu-
late these percentages for each fuel and then propagate the figures
through the model to display the amount of carbon dioxide emissions
per fuel source per activity.
To validate the top-down approach, we also calculate the house-
hold carbon dioxide emissions using a bottom-up approach. We use
the EIA's U.S. Household Electricity Report, which includes a detailed
analysis of end-use electricity consumption for households in 2001.336
For large numbers of household appliances, it provides the average
use per household in kilowatt hours and the number of households
utilizing these appliances.337 From the work discussed above, it is evi-
dent that 69.3% of electricity generated at power plants creates
carbon dioxide emissions (the remainder is generated by nuclear
power, hydropower, etc.). 338 We multiply the EIA's household elec-
tricity-consumption numbers by this percentage to yield an estimate of
the amount of emission-producing electricity used by each appli-
ance. 339 We then convert the reduced electricity values into Btu.
We also calculate a conversion factor for pounds of carbon
dioxide emitted per Btu of electricity by dividing the sum weight of
carbon dioxide emitted in pounds for all electricity sources by the sum
of Btu consumed. Using this factor, we further convert the reduced
electricity values into pounds of carbon dioxide emitted in total and
per household. Since these numbers are intrinsically dependent on
explicit household usage, they represent an estimate of carbon emis-
sions associated with actual behavior. As discussed above,340 we iden-
tify a per-individual number by dividing the carbon dioxide totals by
population size to provide a blended individual average. This
approach allocates to every person a share of emissions regardless of
behavior.
335 D&R INT'L, LTD., 2005 BUILDINGS ENERGY DATA BOOK 4-4 (2005), available at
http://buildingsdatabook.eren.doe.gov/docs/2005bedb-0805.pdf (prepared for Office of
Planning, Budget Formulation & Analysis, U.S. Dept. of Energy).
336 EIA, End Use, supra note 76.
337 Id.
338 EIA, 2004 REVIEW, supra note 62, at 223 (showing that fossil fuels account for 28.25
quadrillion Btu out of total of 40.7 quadrillion Btu consumed to generate electricity in
United States).
339 For example, 304.5 billion kWh consumed in the kitchen x 69.3% of electricity-pro-
ducing CO 2 = 211.0185 billion kWh of emission-producing electricity consumption. See
EIA, End Use, supra note 76 (showing 304.5 billion kWh consumed by kitchen appliances
in 2001).
340 See text accompanying note 77.
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B. Transportation
According to the EIA, the transportation sector is "[a]n energy-
consuming sector that consists of all vehicles whose primary purpose
is transporting people and/or goods from one physical location to
another. '' 341 We divide individual transportation into three categories:
automotive, air, and other. We include in automotive transportation
all personal vehicle use excluding business travel. We include in air
transportation all air travel except business travel and freight. We
assign rail and mass transit to an "other" category and are unable to
account for personal versus business use.
The EIA provides data on the amounts of motor fuel consumed
annually by household uses of passenger cars, vans, SUVs, pickup
trucks, and recreational vehicles. 342 We translate these values into
pounds of carbon dioxide using the same conversion factors used in
the household calculations and then into pounds per person.343
We calculate carbon dioxide emissions for domestic passenger air
travel from values provided by the Bureau of Transportation
Statistics. 344 Using values for the year 2000, we multiply energy inten-
sity per passenger mile (Btu/mile) by the total number of domestic
passenger miles, after reducing the total number of miles to account
for personal versus business travel.345 We convert the resulting figure
into total pounds of carbon dioxide for all passenger air travel using
the conversion factor for jet fuel provided by the EIA,346 and we
divide the total by the total population to yield pounds of carbon
dioxide per person.347
The North American Transportation Statistics (NATS) database
provides values for energy consumed by rail travel. 348 We convert
341 EIA, 2004 REVIEW, supra note 62, at 394 (emphasis removed).
342 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 103, at 53-56 tbl.A1.
343 For example, for passenger cars, 55 billion gallons of petroleum x 19.564 lbs. CO 2 per
gallon petroleum + 281,421,906 people in the United States = 3823.5 lbs. CO 2 per person.
See EIA, LONG FORM, supra note 73, at 47, for conversion factors.
344 BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., NATIONAL TRANSPORTA-
TION STATISTICS 2003 at tbl.4-21 (2003). available at http://www.bts.gov/publications/
national_transportation-statistics/2003/pdf/entire.pdf.
345 Seventy-seven percent of passengers reported that their most recent air travel was
for nonbusiness purposes. See Bureau of Transp. Statistics, supra note 82, at 2.
346 EIA, LONG FORM, supra note 73, at 47.
347 Energy intensity per passenger mile x passenger miles x percentage of nonbusiness
travel x lbs. of carbon dioxide per million Btu of jet fuel + the population, or 3883 x 5.1613
x 10" x 0.77 x 156.258 + 281,421,906 = 857 lbs. of carbon dioxide per person.
348 N. Am. Transp. Statistics Database, Table 4-1: Energy Consumption by Mode of
Transportation, http://nats.sct.gob.mx/nats/sys/tables.jsp?i=3&id=14 (last visited Aug. 18,
2007).
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these energy amounts, given in joules, to Btu and then to pounds of
carbon dioxide using the factors provided by the EIA.
349
The NATS database also provides values for energy consumed by
mass transit.350 We divide these values into fuel sources used-elec-
tricity, gasoline, diesel, and natural gas-and we convert from joules
to Btu. 351 We then convert gasoline, diesel, and natural gas into
pounds of carbon dioxide per person with the conversion factors cited
above. 352 We define a conversion factor for electricity using the same
figures used in household calculations: From electricity calculations,
we divide total pounds of carbon dioxide emitted by total Btu neces-
sary to emit a pound of carbon dioxide per Btu conversion factor,
which converts Btu of electricity used in mass transit into pounds of
carbon dioxide per person.
349 See EIA, LONG FORM, supra note 73, at 47.
350 N. Am. Transp. Statistics Database, supra note 348.
351 See EIA, LONc FORM, supra note 73, at 53 (listing conversion factors for units of
measure).
352 See id. at 47 (listing emission coefficients for different energy sources).
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